Catholic University Law Review
Volume 45
Issue 4 Summer 1996

Article 8

1996

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co: The Supreme Court Clarifies Erisa
Preemption
Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co: The Supreme Court Clarifies Erisa Preemption, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1309 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss4/8

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

NOTES
NEW YORK STATE CONFERENCE OF BLUE
CROSS & BLUE SHIELD PLANS v.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.:

THE SUPREME COURT
CLARIFIES ERISA PREEMPTION
The Employee Retirement Income Sedurity Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 regulates the administration of pension 2 and welfare benefit plans3 offered
by private employers to their employees. 4 In an effort to protect employ1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)) [hereinafter ERISA].
2. Pension benefit plans provide retirement income to employees and often result in
a deferral of income. See ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1994) (defining "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan"). Pension benefit plans are subject to
complex vesting, participation, and funding requirements. See ERISA §§ 201-308, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1994) (setting forth the standards for participation, vesting and funding). Benefits usually are measured by the length of employment and the employee's compensation. VIRGINIA L. BRIGGS ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS DICIONARY 131 (1992).
Neither the amount of benefits received by an employee nor an employer's contribution to
a retirement benefits fund depend on the employer's profits. Id.
3. Generally, a welfare benefit plan provides medical or other health benefits
through the purchase of insurance. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). Unlike
pension benefit plans, welfare benefit plans are not subject to the stringent vesting, participation, and minimum funding requirements imposed upon pension plans. See ERISA
§§ 201, 301, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1081 (1994) (stating that the participation, vesting, and minimum funding standards do not apply to welfare benefit plans); see generally Serrato v.
John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA preempted California's vesting law and that under ERISA, employee welfare benefits do not
vest, meaning that an "'employer may modify or withdraw these benefits at any time, provided the changes are made in compliance with.., the terms of the plan"') (quoting Doe v.
Group Hosp. & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 84 (4th Cir. 1993)); Wulf v. Quantum Chem.
Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1377 (6th Cir.) (noting that employee benefits "do not vest as a matter
of law under ERISA"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994); United Paperworkers int'l
Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 961 F.2d 1384, 1385 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that under
ERISA, welfare benefit plans are not subject to the vesting, participation and minimum
funding requirements imposed upon pension plans); Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039,
1045 (7th Cir.) (holding that under ERISA severance benefits were welfare benefits and
could therefore be amended or eliminated), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).
4. ERISA comprises four titles. Title I protects the interests of employees by imposing reporting and disclosure requirements, participation and vesting requirements, minimum funding standards, fiduciary responsibilities, and administration and enforcement
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ees' rights, 5 ERISA regulates various aspects of pension and welfare benefit plans,6 including reporting and disclosure,7 participation and

procedures. ERISA §§ 2-609, 29 U.S.C.'§§ 1001-1169 (1994); see also infra notes 7-10 (discussing these requirements in more detail).
Title 11 sets forth tax implications. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 898 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
Title IIl outlines the jurisdiction of federal agencies. ERISA §§ 3001-3043, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1242 (1994). The Departments of Treasury and Labor share the jurisdiction, administration, and enforcement of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1204 (1994).
Title IV establishes a plan termination insurance program to be administered by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [hereinafter PBGC]. ERISA §§ 4001-4402, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1994). The PBGC is an independent non-profit corporation established within the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). The role of the PBGC is
to encourage employers to establish and maintain pension plans, "to provide for the timely
and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits," and to maintain and collect premiums to
finance its operations. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1994). Ultimately, the PBGC acts as a guarantor of pension benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1994). Unfortunately, the PBGC suffers from
a billion dollar deficit and faces an uncertain future. See Jonathan Peterson, Promise of
U.S. Pension Agency Dims, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1986, § 4 (Business), at 1.
5. According to the House Education and Labor Committee, the purpose of ERISA
is to "assure American workers that they may look forward, with anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be
lacking in the necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society." H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646.
6. Thomas W. Jennings, Introduction, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1, 6-8
(Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., 1991) (discussing the ways in which ERISA reformed employee benefit and pension plan law in the United States); see also Daniel W.
Sherrick, ERISA Preemption:An Introduction, 64 MICH. B. J. 1074, 1074-75 (1985) (providing a short, insightful explanation of ERISA's preemption clause).
7. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1994). ERISA requires ERISA plan
providers to file reports with the federal government and disclose information regarding
the plan to all participants. Id.; see Robert J. Drapikoski, Reporting and Disclosure Requirements for Plans Covered by ERISA, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, 13, 13-26
(Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., 1991) (providing a thorough, updated discussion of
ERISA reporting and disclosure requirements). The reporting and disclosure requirements are designed to protect the interests of plan participants. Id. at 13; see Rucker v.
Pacific FM, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that Congress enacted
the reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA to inform participants of their rights
and obligations). Extensive reporting and disclosure requirements make monitoring and
enforcing the lengthy and complex provisions more manageable. Drapikoski, supra at 1314.
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vesting,8 minimum funding standards, 9 and the fiduciary responsibilities
of plan administrators.1" It does not mandate particular benefits.1"
In an attempt to oversee effectively the complex administration of em12
ployee plans, Congress included a preemption clause within ERISA.
8. ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. 99 1051-1060 (1994). Vesting is a "process whereby
accrued benefits under a plan become nonforfeitable to the participant." BRIGGS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 187; see also Smith v. Rochester Tel. Business Mktg. Corp., 786 F. Supp.
293, 300-01 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that a pre-pension leave plan was subject to ERISA's nonforfeitability provisions and that employer could not terminate those benefits
based on the fact that the employee began working for a competitor before he officially
retired), aff d, 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1994). Participation rules regulate the point at which
an employee becomes a participant, i.e. eligible to receive a benefit. BRIGGS ET AL., supra
note 2, at 128. Participation and vesting standards were adopted to ensure that plans benefit a larger number of employees. See generally, Jennings, supra note 6, at 6-7 (providing a
general introduction to ERISA).
9. ERISA §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1086 (1994). ERISA sets statutory minimums and maximums on the amounts that an employer may contribute annually to certain
types of benefit plans. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1994) (minimum funding standards); ERISA § 305, 29 U.S.C. § 1085 (1994) (alternative minimum funding standard).
Minimums help ensure that the fund has enough assets to cover its operating costs and
liabilities. BRIGGS ET AL., supra note 2, at 112; see generally, Michael A. Archer, Minimum
Funding Requirements, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, 119, 119-151 (Martin Wald
& David E. Kenty eds., 1991) (providing a detailed explanation of ERISA's minimum
funding requirements). Maximum funding requirements protect against the abuse of the
tax advantages of ERISA. See Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How
Much Is Too Much?, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (providing an in-depth analysis
of ERISA's maximum funding limitations).
10. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994). In addition to requiring the
pension plan to list "named fiduciaries," who always owe fiduciary duties, ERISA also
provides standards governing fiduciary conduct. ERISA provides a functional definition of
the term "fiduciary." Whether a person is a fiduciary depends upon his authority and
responsibility with respect to the plan. See ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21) (1994);
Cassandra G. Sasso, Liability of Fiduciaries Under ERISA, 21 COLO. LAW. 197, 197-98
(1992) (distinguishing between named and functional fiduciaries and providing a general
discussion of the liability of fiduciaries under ERISA); see generally Jacqueline M.
Kraeutler & Charles Lerner, ERISA's Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions, in ERISA: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, 153,153-189 (Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., 1991) (providing a thorough and updated discussion of the role of fiduciaries under ERISA).
11. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1674 (1995) (noting that ERISA's regulation of the administration of
pension and welfare benefit plans does not provide a "set of minimum benefits"); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (noting that although ERISA imposes various
regulatory burdens on pension plans, and sets standards for pension and welfare plans, it
does not require employers to provide specific benefits).
12. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). The preemption clause states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title.
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The purpose of the preemption clause is to ensure national uniformity of
pension benefit protections. 13 National uniformity in employee benefit
regulations protects both employees and employers. 14 By preventing
inefficiency and avoiding administrative complexities, a national standard
can reduce 15
the costs of maintaining plans and safeguard benefits for
participants.

As this nation continues to debate the merits of health care reform and
the need for employer-provided health benefit plans,16 federal preemption of state law has become an increasingly important issue within the
13. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., Id Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4650. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987) (holding that
§ 514(a) of ERISA did not preempt a state statute requiring employers to provide severance pay because it concerned a benefit, as opposed to a plan); Moore v. Philip Morris
Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 341 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted a state statute
providing that an adulterous spouse who leaves home would forfeit his or her right to the
property and estate of the other spouse and noting Congress's intent to provide national
uniformity in enacting ERISA's preemption clause).
14. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of maintaining nationally uniform laws regarding employee benefits).
15. Id.
16. There have been numerous health care reform plans recently introduced in Congress including the Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(the Clinton health plan); American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (the Wellston-McDermott plan); Health Plan Purchasing Cooperative Act
of 1993, H.R. 3652, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (the Chafee-Dole plan); Affordable Health
Care Now Act of 1993, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (House Republican plan).
See generally John Harwood, Rival Plans Gain Strength But None Claim Majority, WALL
ST. J.,Oct. 28, 1993, at A18 (summarizing each of the proposed acts); Hearings on Health
Care Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the
House Comm. on Education & Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 450-52 (1994) (testimony of
Carolyn B. Robinowitz, M.D.) (providing a brief synopsis of various health care
legislation).
The following articles provide detailed discussion regarding the interplay between ERISA and health care: Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 255 (1990) (arguing that
unless Congress amends ERISA to allow for state experimentation in health care reform, a
federal solution offers the best hope for comprehensive coverage); Jeffrey A. Brauch,
Health Care Providers Meet ERISA: Are Provider Claims for Misrepresentationof Coverage Preempted?, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 497, 498 (1993) (concluding that ERISA should not
preempt health care provider misrepresentation claims because the claims have too tenuous a relationship to ERISA plans to warrant preemption); Margaret M. Keefe, Three
States Focus on Reform at Home, 48 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV. 38 (1993) (discussing
state health care reform proposals in Vermont, Minnesota, and Colorado); James B. Kenny
& Sean Sullivan, Health Care Reform: National,State and Local Directions, 18 EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS J. 41 (1993) (noting that ERISA acts as an obstacle to local and state health care
reform); Bill Would Authorize Implementation of Health Care Reform at the State Level, 47
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV. 52 (1992) (discussing the State Care Act of 1992, which
would enable states to proceed with health care reform by amending ERISA to curtail its
preemptive effect); Robert S. McDonough, Note, ERISA Preemption of State MandatedProvider Laws, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1194, 1216 (concluding that "mandated-provider laws
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field of employee benefits. 1 7 Many Americans obtain health insurance
through their employers, and, as a result, are affected indirectly by ERISA's regulation of employee benefit plans.1 8 By ensuring that states
cannot interfere with the federal government's efforts to require nondis-

should be preempted as applied to insurance policies purchased by employee benefit plans
regulated by ERISA").
17. See, e.g., Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 609, 609-10 (1995) (discussing the impact of ERISA on state
health care reform and congressional proposals to grant states a waiver to ERISA's preemptive effect); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal
Health Care: A Callfor "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 408 (1994) (warning that the preemptive effects of exclusive federal employee benefits regulation could be damaging to states'
ability to promote state health care policy and develop innovative health care systems);
James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, FederalPreemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CMI. L. REV. 23, 24 (1978) (discussing
generally ERISA's preemption of state law); Leon E. Irish & Harrison J.Cohen, ERISA
Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 156-63
(1985) (criticizing ERISA's preemption clause and explaining that courts have had difficulty interpreting its scope); Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of StopLoss Insurance on Self-Insured Health Plans, 14 VA. TAX REV. 615 (1995) (providing a
comprehensive summary of judicial interpretation of the scope of ERISA's preemption
clause as related to self-insured welfare benefit plans utilizing stop-loss coverage and calling for guidance for the Supreme Court); Michael S. Ackerman, Note, ERISA: Preemption
of State Health Care Laws and Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 825,847-52 (1981)
(reporting that ERISA's preemption clause has undermined states' efforts at addressing
the need for health-care solutions at the state level); Gary A. Francesconi, Note, ERISA
Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws - An Essential Step Toward National Health
Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227,243-61 (1995) (discussing the role of ERISA preemption of "Any-Willing Provider" laws in the movement toward national health care reform);
Jolee A. Hancock, Comment, Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws Fall Prey to
ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 383 (1994-1995) (discussing the "disastrous" effect
of ERISA on state health care reform); Lizzette Palmer, Comment, ERISA Preemption
and its Effects on Capping the Health Benefits of Individuals with AIDS: A Demonstration
of why the United States Health and Insurance Systems Require Substantial Reform, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1347 (1993) (discussing ERISA's effect on welfare benefits as it relates to
employers' ability to cap the health benefits of people with AIDS).
18. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that as many
as "[e]ighty-eight percent of non-elderly Americans have private health care insurance
through their employee welfare benefit plans"), rev'd sub nom., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); see
also Groves, supra note 17, at 617 n.40 (noting that an estimated 150 million Americans
obtain health insurance through an ERISA plan).
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criminatory1 9 and adequately funded2" employee benefit programs, ERISA's preemption clause plays a vital role in the administration of these
employee benefit plans.2 1
19. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION & EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
199 (2d ed. 1995). ERISA includes rules to ensure that employers do not establish and
maintain plans for the sole benefit of highly compensated employees by denying favorable
tax treatment to plans that discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. Id. To
prevent discrimination, ERISA imposes minimum coverage and participation requirements. Id. ERISA also regulates the degree to which contributions or benefits may vary
from participant to participant. Id. at 199-200; see also BRIGGS ET AL., supra note 2, at 4647 (providing a definition and an example of "discrimination" within the context of employee benefit plans); Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans:
Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 463 (1984) (concluding
that ERISA's non-discrimination provisions will not achieve wide-spread coverage for
lower paid employees).
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing funding requirements).
21. For scholarship endorsing the expansiveness of ERISA's preemption clause, see
generally David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 427, 429 (1987) (tracing the evolution of ERISA's
"broad preemption of state law" and discussing the relationship between federal and state
regulation of employee pension and welfare benefit plans); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra
note 17, at 23-24, 38-43 (arguing that ERISA's preemption clause should be applied as
broadly as possible to further Congress's purpose of promoting national uniformity in the
regulation of employee benefit and welfare plans); Daly D. Temchine & Marcia S. Handler, U.S. Supreme Court's Travelers Decision Preserves ERISA Preemption, 22 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at 1837 (Aug. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Decision] (stating that the Travelers
decision can be interpreted as preserving the scope of ERISA's preemption clause, rather
than reducing it).
For articles discussing the negative effects of expansively interpreting ERISA's preemption clause, see generally Groves, supra note 17 (discussing the negative impact of ERISA
on state health care reform and examining congressional proposals to grant state waivers
to ERISA's preemptive effect); Holloway, supra note 17 (discussing the negative effects of
ERISA preemption on states' ability to reform health care); Irish & Cohen, supra note 17
(criticizing ERISA's preemption clause and explaining why courts have had difficulty interpreting its scope); William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron, The Preemption of State Law
Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L.J. 383, 394-420 (concluding that Congress should amend ERISA to exempt specific state alimony and child support laws from federal preemption and
that courts interpret ERISA's preemption clause unnecessarily broadly because Congress
chose to preempt state laws "relating to" employee benefit plans, rather than subjects covered by the Act); William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating
to Employee Benefit Plans:An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1313, 132738 (1984) (suggesting an alternative approach to interpreting ERISA's preemption clause);
Peter H. Thrza & Lorraine Halloway, Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 163, 212-25 (1979) (discussing the potential positive and negative effects of amending ERISA's preemption clause to restrict its
scope and recommending that Congress should wait to see how the courts interpret the
clause); ERISA Preemption Encourages Innovation in Health Care System, 22 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 12, at 712 (March 20, 1995) [hereinafter Innovation] (discussing the effect of
ERISA's preemptive provision on employers' ability to initiate health care reforms in the
marketplace because of their ability to operate plans across state lines in a consistent manner); Hancock, supra note 17, at 383 (discussing the "disastrous" effect of ERISA on state
health care reform).
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Despite the significance of ERISA's powerful preemption clause, its
scope remains somewhat undefined, making it difficult for courts to de-

termine whether ERISA preempts a state law.2" The method of analysis
for determining whether a state law triggers ERISA's preemption clause
greatly affects the regulation of health care plans. 3 Specifically, the
method of analysis impacts the ability of states to be involved actively in

22. The scope of ERISA's preemption clause has been heavily litigated within the
federal courts of appeals and district courts. According to Justice Stevens, "[a] recent
LEXIS search indicates that there are now over 2,800 judicial opinions addressing ERISA
preemption." District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Different circuits have employed different methods of analyzing whether state laws trigger ERISA's preemption clause. Compare Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying an expansive interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause to hold that hospital surcharge provisions had a sufficient "connection with" an ERISA plan to trigger preemption), rev'd sub nom., New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)
with United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.,
995 F.2d 1179, 1195 (3rd Cir.) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of the ERISA preemption clause, consequently finding that a state law did not "relate to" an ERISA plan
because it did not have a sufficient "connection with" or impact on an ERISA plan to
trigger preemption), cert. denied sub nom., NYSA-ILA Welfare Fund v. Dunston, 510 U.S.
944 (1993). See Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
619, 620 (1994) (noting that "[u]ncertainty as to what principles, policies, and considerations courts should rely on generates rampant disagreement over even simple questions").
For examples of circuit courts relying on either the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the preemption clause, or the multi-factor approach, see infra note 85. For an
explanation of the differences between the Supreme Courts's traditional approach to interpreting ERISA's preemption clause and the multi-factor approach, see infra notes 74-77
and accompanying text.
23. See Hancock, supra note 17, at 383 (arguing that ERISA's expansive preemption
clause has had a "disastrous" effect on states' abilities to reform health care); Jerry L.
Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28
CONN. L. REV. 115, 116 (1995) (arguing that a Federalist approach offers the best solution
to reforming our country's health care system). However, the authors note that certain
constituencies are satisfied with ERISA preemption. Id. at 125. But see K. Peter Schmidt,
Problems with Health Care Federalism, 28 CONN. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (1995) (arguing that
in a society where large national and regional corporations provide health coverage to
their employees, preemption plays an important role in reducing administrative burdens
and preventing the creation of a "crazy quilt of inconsistent state laws").
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health care reform.2 4 Thus, the preemption clause of ERISA clearly
25

plays a significant, albeit indirect, role in the lives of many Americans.

The preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution 2 6 and evolved out of the seminal Supreme
Court case Gibbons v. Ogden. 27 Preemption may be triggered by an express provision within a statute, 28 by implication through the presence of
a federal scheme of regulation,29 or by a direct conflict between state and
24. Holloway, supra note 17, at 422 (discussing the negative impact of ERISA on
states' health care reform efforts). ERISA severely restrains the ability of states to reform
health care. Id. More specifically, "[s]tates are finding that the broad interpretation of the
ERISA preemption clause ...stymie[s] efforts to provide access to and pay for health
care." Id.; see also U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to State Surcharges on Hospital
Bills, 22 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1129 (May 1, 1995) [hereinafter Surcharges] (reporting that representatives of state health plans were enthusiastic about the Supreme Court's
decision in Travelers, believing that it allowed states more control over reforming their
health care systems). But see ERISA Preemption Brings Uniformity to Benefit Plan Regulation, ERIC Says, 20 Pens. Rptr. (BNA) No. 9, at 534 (Mar. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Uniformity] (stating that "[i]nconsistent state regulation would make it harder to administer a
multi-state health plan and would make it more expensive for a plan to offer the same
coverage to all employees"). According to the President of the ERISA Industry Committee [ERIC], allowing states to regulate health plans will result in a '"crazy quilt of laws
against health plans, [harming] employees and employers."' Id.
25. See Legislation Needed to Remove Ambiguity From ERISA, Witnesses Tell Labor
Panel, 22 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1772 (July 31, 1995). When testifying before the
Senate Labor Panel, Mark Nadel, associate director for national & public issues for the
General Accounting Office, stated that, "[e]mployers ...maintain that ERISA has been
integral to their ability to control benefit costs and tailor plans to reflect their employees'
needs, because they are subject to one federal law rather than a patchwork of 50 state
laws." Id.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id. See also New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995) (noting
that the Supremacy Clause allows federal law to preempt state law).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (stating that federal law preempts state law where
state laws "interfere with or are contrary to the laws of Congress"); see generally JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 319 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing generally federal preemption of state law).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (noting that Congress
may preempt state law by including express language in a federal law to prohibit state
regulation of an area).
29. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining that
Congress may preempt state law by implication where a "scheme of federal regulation [is]
...so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it" or "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject"); see also NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 319 (explaining that Congress may expressly or impliedly
"occupy the field," thereby causing preemption). Because Congress usually does not occupy expressly an area of regulation, preemption cases often focus on the issue of Congressional intent. Id.
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federal law that precludes compliance with both.31 Section 514 of ERISA31 expressly mandates that ERISA shall "supersede any and all state

laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.",32 Because of its broad, general language, section 514 caused confusion regarding the scope of ERISA's preemptive effect. 33 In fact, the
language of section 514 does not clarify what is required to demonstrate
that a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan.3 4
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co. ,31 the Supreme Court clarified the methodology
for determining whether a state law falls within the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause.3 6 The state law at issue in Travelers required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurance
companies, but not from patients covered by Blue Cross and Blue
30. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (stating that state law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with
federal law, such as in situations "when 'compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility' . . . or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' (citations omitted);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (stating that where state laws "interfere with, or are contrary to" federal law, they are preempted).
31. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994); see supra note 12 (reproducing the complete text of
§ 514(a)).
33. Leon Irish and Harrison Cohen described the confusion surrounding ERISA's
preemptive effect, noting that "[s]ection 514(a) has unavoidably ... called for unreasonable and impractical results" and has "also created unnecessary problems for ... the judiciary." Irish & Cohen, supra note 17, at 110. The extremely broad wording of § 514 has
contributed to a "collection of decisions notable fo" their diverse rationales and their diverse levels of rationality." Id. at 111.
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995), the Court held that to determine whether a state law "relates
to" an ERISA plan, one "must go beyond the unhelpful text [of § 514(a)] and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term ["relate to"] and look instead to the objectives of the
ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive." Id. at 1677.
34. See Conison, supra note 22, at 620 (commenting on the "rampant disagreement"
regarding the issue of ERISA preemption and noting that even twenty years after the
enactment of ERISA, the issue of preemption is plagued by uncertainty); Hutchinson &
Ifshin, supra note 17, at 23 (explaining that disagreement about the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause reveals the larger problem regarding the status of the American federalist system and the relationship between state and federal law); Kilberg & Heron, supra
note 21, at 385 (stating that "[a]lthough the broad language of section 514, ERISA's preemption provision, may appear quite clear upon superficial examination, the law concerning the extent of ERISA's preemption of state law remains unsettled").
35. 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995).
36. Id. at 1676-80 (examining the text of ERISA's preemption clause, the intent behind Congress's enactment of the provision, the purpose of the state law at issue, the effect
of the state law on ERISA plans, and deciding whether the subject of the state law has
been historically a matter of local concern).
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Shield.37 Hospitals retained these surcharges to control costs and to increase hospitalization coverage of uninsured patients. 38 In response to

the surcharge statute, several commercial insurers sued the state of New
York, claiming that ERISA preempted the state statute.3 9

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the commercial insurers' motion for summary judgment with respect to the preemption issue.4 ° Relying on Supreme Court precedent,4
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court's holding that ERISA preempted the surcharge law.42 The
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision4 3 and held that the
New York statute's surcharge provisions did not "relate to" employee
benefit plans in such a way as to trigger preemption.44 In determining
that ERISA did not preempt the New York statute, the Court departed
from its tendency to rule in favor of preemption based on the "broad
common-sense meaning" of the phrase "relate to."' 45 Instead, it utilized a

more practical method of determining whether a state law falls within the
37. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1993). See Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the "surcharges are designed to
increase hospital costs for patients covered by health plans other than the Blues, and thus
make these competing plans less attractive"), rev'd sub nom., New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995). Blue Cross
and Blue Shield are not considered commercial insurers. See Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 167374 (noting that the New York statute requires hospitals to collect surcharges from patients
with commercial health insurance but not from patients covered by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield). Through surcharges, commercial insurers subsidize the costs of uninsured patients. See also Experts Divided Over Impact of U.S. Supreme Court ERISA Decision, 22
Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1348 (June 5, 1995) [hereinafter Experts Divided] (describing
the New York statute).
38. Travelers, 14 F.3d at 712.
39. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 14 F.3d
708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995). Blue Cross and Blue Shield and
the Hospital Association of New York State intervened as defendants. Id.
40. Id. at 1012.
41. Travelers, 14 F.3d at 717-21; see also supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's expansive application of § 514 to determine whether ERISA preempts a state law).
42. Travelers, 14 F.3d at 725.
43. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1683.
44. Id. at 1680.
45. Id. at 1677. The Court noted that "prior attempt[s] to construe the phrase 'relate
to"' in terms of the normal sense of the phrase did not provide any real guidance in this
instance. Id. Prior to Travelers, the Supreme Court applied the phrase "relate to" in its
"broad common-sense meaning." Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (citing
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
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scope of ERISA's preemption clause.4 6 The Court recognized that its
expansive interpretation of the phrase "relate to" did not function as a
helpful guide for determining the scope of ERISA's preemption clause.4 7
This Note begins with an analysis of ERISA's preemption clause prior
to the Travelers decision and describes the conflicting methods of determining whether a state law triggers section 514's preemption. This analysis includes a summary of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the
proper method for determining whether a state law falls within the scope
of ERISA's preemption clause. This Note also describes the two methods of analysis that developed within the circuit courts prior to the Travelers decision. Next, this Note examines the Court's clarification of section
514 preemption analysis and concludes that the Court effectively restricted the scope of ERISA's preemption clause. Finally, this Note comments on the Travelers decision's impact on the states' role in health care
administration and reform.

I.

DETERMINING WHETHER A STATE LAW FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF

ERISA's

PREEMPTION CLAUSE PRIOR TO TRA VELERS:

THE "SARGASSO SEA OF OBFUSCATION"

Employer-provided pension and welfare benefit plans have an extensive history in the United States.4" Pension plans developed in this country as early as 1875, 49 and, unfortunately, have been abused since their
46. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-80 (1995) (focusing on Congressional intent and
the purpose and effect of the state law at issue); see also Experts Divided, supra note 37, at
1348 (stating that ERISA had previously been interpreted expansively, but that this decision represented a "backing away from some of the logic of its previous decisions" toward
a more pragmatic approach).
47. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677; see also Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348
(describing the Court's change in logic).
48. See generally Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why was ERISA Enacted? The ERISA of 1974: The First Decade, an InformationalPaperof the U.S. Senate Special Committee
on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (Sen. Print 1984); WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P.
KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976) (examining the history and public policy
behind pension plans); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 2-16 (discussing the origins of
the pension system); MURRAY W. LATIMER, 2 INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1933) (providing an in-depth study of American pension
plans); JOSEPH J. MELONE & EVERETr T. ALLEN, JR., PENSION PLANNING: PENSIONS,
PROFIT SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 1, 1-19 (rev. ed. 1972)
(providing an overview of the development of private pension plans in the United States);
Gregory, supra note 21, at 437-49 (providing an overview of ERISA's history, purpose and
policies); Jennings, supra note 6, 2-6 (providing a detailed discussion on the evolution of
employee benefits programs in the United States); Turza & Halloway, supra note 21, at
169-74 (discussing federal and state regulation of pension and welfare benefit plans prior to
ERISA).
49. Jennings, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that one of the earliest private pension plans in
the United States was established by the American Express Company in 1875).
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creation.50 While many hoped that pension plans would provide immediate security for workers, the economic turmoil of the Great Depression
proved otherwise. 5 '
After the stock market crash of 1929, retirement security became a virtual illusion.52 Employers inadequately financed and fraudulently administered many plans. 53 For example, employers often used workers'
contributions to pension plans to fund union activities unrelated to retirement. 54 In many cases, plans limited coverage to a very small number of
employees and benefitted only high ranking employees. 55 These
problems became painfully clear in 1963, when the Studebaker Automo-

bile Company closed its doors and left 4,400 employees without their
vested pensions.5 6
Discovery of rampant abuse of employee benefit plans encouraged

state regulation.57 State regulation, however, resulted in a troublesome
50. Id. at 2-5; see also Gregory, supra note 21, at 443 (explaining how pension plan
abuses led to enactment of ERISA).
51. Jennings, supra note 6, at 2-3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2. Today, the problem of inadequate funding continues. See Peterson, supra
note 4, at 1 (describing the financial and political problems facing the federal agency that
guarantees private pension plans). In 1985, the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation terminated seven pension plans when faced with financial trouble. Id. Pension plans are a
popular target for abuse due to their enormous amounts of assets. See William S. Cohen,
Gambling With The Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1986, at A25. According to William
Cohen, a former United States Senator from Maine, a financial scandal is likely. Id. Cohen predicted that by the end of the century, pension plans may own half of all publically
traded corporate stock. Id. He further noted that these assets are handled by only 25
investment management firms. Id. Cohen warned that due to the pressures of the market
place, pension plan managers may find it difficult to adhere to their fiduciary duty to work
for the sole benefit of plan participants. Id.
54. Jennings, supra note 6, at 2.
55. Id. at 2-3.
56. Id. at 4-5. For a brief synopsis of the Studebaker incident, see LANGBEIN & WOLK,
supra note 19, at 62-66. Studebaker was the fourth largest auto manufacturer at one time
in its 111 year history. Casey Bukro, Studebaker left automotive legacy that rides throughout time, CHI. TRw., July 19, 1989, at C8. Prior to its closing, the Studebaker Company
occupied an important place in the community of South Bend, Indiana, in which its plants
were located. Id. Workers generally remembered the Studebaker Company's generosity
to workers and the community. Id. This image changed when the Studebaker plant moved
to Canada in 1964, forcing its workers to search for jobs elsewhere and depriving them of
their pensions and medical benefits. Laurie Goering, Workers who lost their pensions decades ago seek relief in bill, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1991, at C13. One former Studebaker
employee was forced to take a 50% pay cut at another plant following the closing of the
Studebaker plant. Id. Incidents such as this prompted Congress to enact ERISA. Id.
57. Jennings, supra note 6, at 2-8 (discussing the abuses of pension plans and the rise
in regulations regarding such plans).
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lack of uniformity among benefit plans throughout the nation.5 8 Ultimately, the desire for a uniform national system of regulating employee
benefit plans prompted the enactment of ERISA in 1974.59 Accordingly,
Congress included a broad preemption clause in ERISA6 ° to allow a single set of regulations to govern the administration of benefit plans.6 1
Preemption was necessary to ensure that plans would operate consistently across state lines,62 especially where plans covered employees in

more than one state.63 Without ERISA's preemption clause, employee
58. See Gregory, supra note 21, at 443 (discussing the abuse of pension plans in general and the failure of state regulations as either remedial or enforcement instruments);
Jennings, supra note 6, at 2-6 (discussing pension plan abuses prompting the enactment of
ERISA). These abuses continued to be a concern even after states began regulating benefits and were among the concerns addressed in ERISA. See id.
59. Kurt R. Anderson, Current Issues in ERISA Preemption, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 249-50 (Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., 1991). ERISA's statutory
language recites the congressional findings and declaration of policy upon which ERISA is
based. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The House Committee on Education and Labor predicted that ERISA's "most important purpose will be to assure American workers that
they may look forward, with anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain
them as human beings within our society." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974)
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646; see also supra notes 1-12 and accompanying
text (discussing generally the composition of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994))).

For ERISA's legislative history, see generally

BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,

SELEcTIVE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1974-1991 (Paul Albergo ed.,
TIONAL AFFAIRS, ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE (Michael

ERISA:

1992); BUREAU OF NAG. Kushner & Dana J.

Domone eds., 1995).
60. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Section 514(a) states that ERISA
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 59, at 250-52 (discussing how
Congress intended ERISA's preemption clause to ensure uniformity among pension
plans).
61. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). In implementing
ERISA, Congress relied on its broad power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state
law. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4646; see also, Francesconi, supra note 17, at 235.
62. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677-78 (1995) (finding that "[t]he basic thrust of the preemption
clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans"); see also McDonough, supra note 16,
at 1194 (arguing that state mandated-provider laws affect the insurance policies purchased
by ERISA plans and therefore should be preempted by ERISA); Innovation, supra note
21, at 712 (reporting that a paper released by the Corporate Health Care Coalition found
that preemption enables employers to operate plans across state lines consistently).
63. Large multi-state employers benefit from national uniformity. See Uniformity,
supra note 24, at 534 (reporting that multi-state health plans would face increased costs in
the absence of national uniformity). Large corporations are not the only beneficiaries of
national uniformity; even small employers located near state borders benefit from national
uniformity. See Innovation, supra note 21, at 712. "At least 46 [sic] cities in the United
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benefit plans could be subjected to fifty different sets of state law, 6 4 resuiting in unreasonable administrative Costs 65 that might discourage employers from providing employee benefits.66 Ironically, laws enacted to
protect plan participants could discourage employers from establishing

and maintaining plans, thereby undermining the purpose of the regulations.67 The existence of ERISA's preemption clause reduces this dilemma and helps to ensure nationwide uniformity so that employers are
not burdened by complex regulations that make offering employee bene68
fit plans administratively unfeasible.
States border another state and as a result have 'substantial trans-border health care markets."' Id. (quoting Kristin Bass, co-author of the paper released by the corporate Healthcare Coalition); see also Alessi v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525-26 (1981)
(striking down a state law because the law's effect forced the employer to structure all
benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey law, or alternatively to adopt different
payment formulae for employees inside and outside the state).
The Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and New York City metro areas offer
prime examples of cities that employ individuals from more than one state. In Washington,
D.C., workers travel from Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. In Philadelphia, employees travel to work from other parts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. New York
City attracts workers from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. ERISA preemption sought to avoid the evil of requiring an employer to "accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a system for processing claims and paying benefits."
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987).
64. Anderson, supra note 59, at 250; Innovation, supra note 21, at 712.
65. Innovation, supra note 21, at 712. For example, subjecting a small employer in
Philadelphia who employed individuals from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware to
three different sets of regulations regarding employee health benefits would render establishing and maintaining a health plan extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. Multistate employers with offices scattered throughout the nation would face the same dilemma.
Id.: see also Uniformity, supra note 24, at 534 (reporting that according to the president of
the ERISA Industry Committee, "[i]nconsistent state regulation would make it harder to
administer a multi-state health plan and would make it more expensive for a plan to offer
the same coverage to all employees"); Innovation, supra note 21, at 712 (noting that the
health care marketplace "'expand[s] across state lines"') (quoting Kristin Bass, co-author
of paper released March 14, 1995 by the Corporate Health Care Coalition).
66. Innovation, supra note 21, at 712.
67. See Airparts Co., Inc. v. Custom Benefit Servs. of Austin, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 870,
873 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding that Congress intended ERISA preemption to ensure national
uniformity within benefits law, "thereby preventing inefficiencies working to the detriment
of plan beneficiaries"), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1994).
68. See id. at 873 (noting that national uniformity protects participants from the evils
of inefficiently administered plans); DiPietro-Kay Corp. v. Interactive Benefits Corp., 825
F. Supp. 459, 461 (D. Conn. 1993) (holding that a state common law claim for misrepresentation in the sale of an insurance policy is not related to an ERISA plan for the purposes of
ERISA preemption and noting that "[pjreemption was created because benefit plans entail
a myriad of administrative activities that would be difficult to coordinate if plans were
subject to different regulations in different states") (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987)).
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Generally, a state law triggers ERISA's preemption clause when the
law "relate[s] to" a plan covered by ERISA.6 9 Unfortunately, ERISA
to." 70
itself provides no insight as to the meaning of the phrase "relate
As a result, the scope of ERISA's preemption clause is unclear,7 ' making
it difficult to determine whether a state law is preempted. 72 The uncertainty of the meaning of the phrase "relate to" has confused lower courts
attempting to determine whether ERISA preempts state laws and
regulations.73
69. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1994); see, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (attempting to provide guidance as to the meaning of the phrase
"relate to"); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (same);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (same); see also Anderson, supra
note 59, at 252 (discussing generally the broad scope of ERISA preemption); Conison,
supra note 22 at 669 (providing an excellent analysis of the language of § 514 and the
difficulty of interpreting the phrase "relate to").
70. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (containing no definitions of the
phrase "relate to").
71. Although Congress included an expansive preemptive provision within ERISA, it
provided some explicit exceptions to preemption, as set forth in a section commonly referred to as the "savings clause." See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1994). State laws regulating "insurance, banking, or securities," are saved from preemption. Id.; see Anderson, supra note 59, at 258-69 (discussing generally the savings clause).
Despite the fact that these exceptions appear very straightforward, courts frequently are
faced with state laws that arguably could be considered "health laws" rather than insurance
laws. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) (rejecting
the argument that a state law requiring minimum mental health care benefits is a health
law rather than an insurance law).
For example, "mandated-provider" laws require insurance companies to pay for services
covered under a policy regardless of what type of physician provided the service. McDonough, supra note 16, at 1199. Thus, insurance companies must pay for the service of an eye
exam, whether provided by an optometrist or opthamologist. Id. To escape preemption,
these laws may be characterized as insurance regulatory laws rather than health laws. Id.
at 1198-99. When categorized as an insurance law, the state law will not be preempted.
See id. at 1199 (explaining that although mandated-provider laws relate to an employee
benefit plan because they impact the terms of the insurance plans purchased by employers,
they will not be preempted if the court determines that the laws are meant to regulate
insurance). This type of health care/insurance law is widespread. Id. at 1194 n.8 (explaining that "[m]andated provider laws ... have been adopted in nearly every state").
72. See generally Irish & Cohen, supra note 17 (discussing the difficulty of interpreting
the scope of § 514); McDonough, supra note 16, at 1216 (noting that "mandated-provider
laws do not regulate insurance," yet arguing that mandated-provider laws should be preempted, insofar as they relate to insurance policies purchased by ERISA plans).
73. See discussion infra Parts L.A - I.C (discussing the broad and narrow approaches to
determining whether a state law has triggered ERISA preemption). Various circuits have
adopted different methods of determining whether a state law falls within the scope of
§ 514. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that its
decision directly conflicted with the Third Circuit), rev'd sub nom., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); see
also Anderson, supra note 59, at 94-100 (cum. supp. 1995). Some courts have taken an
expansive approach, while others have been less quick to provide ERISA's preemptive
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In an effort to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the phrase "relate[s]
to," courts applied either the "connection with" analysis resulting in an

expansive interpretation of the scope of ERISA's preemption, 74 or a
multi-factor analysis, which limited the scope of section 514(a).7 5 Courts
based the "connection with" analysis on the Supreme Court's insistence
76
that the words "relate to" be given their literal, common sense meaning.
In contrast, the multi-factor analysis focused on specific factors to determine whether ERISA preempts a state law, rather than trying to determine whether a law has a "connection with" an ERISA plan.77
Because ERISA regulates employer-provided health care benefits, the
method of analysis used to determine whether a state law triggers section
514 directly affects the ability of states to enact legislation regarding
health care. 78 When courts apply the more predictable multi-factor analysis, state legislatures can determine more easily whether a state law will
clause with such a broad scope. See infra note 88 (providing a lengthy list of cases regarding the scope of ERISA's preemption clause).
74. See First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546, 1549
(11th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has consistently recognized the expansive sweep of the preemption clause"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Pomeroy v. Johns
Hopkins Medical Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Md. 1994) (applying the "connection with" standard to determine that ERISA may preempt laws which have only an indirect impact on employee benefit plans). This expansive method of analysis is based on
Supreme Court precedent. See infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court decisions analyzing whether a state law triggers § 514 prior to Travelers).
75. The multi-factor analysis limits the scope of ERISA preemption in that it rejects
the more malleable "connection with" method of analysis. When courts apply the factor
based test for preemption, there is less judicial discretion to determine that a state law
relates to an ERISA plan. See infra notes 126-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
more narrow multi-factor analysis).
76. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1990) (explaining that a state
law having a "connection with" an ERISA plan "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan, thereby
triggering § 514 preemption); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (same);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (same); see also Conison, supra
note 22, at 634 (discussing in detail the "semantics" of the language in § 514).
77. See Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341,
1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (specifying seven factors to be examined in determining whether
ERISA preempts a state law), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); see infra notes 126-51 and
accompanying text (discussing the multi-factor analysis).
78. Holloway, supra note 17, at 422 (arguing that a "broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption clause ... stymiels] efforts to provide access to and pay for health care");
Hancock, supra note 17, at 383 (discussing the "disastrous" effect of ERISA preemption
on state health care reform). See generally Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1129 (reporting
that the Supreme Court's recognition of the inadequacy of the "connection with" analysis
was "great news for hospitals and their patients" because New York can continue to reform
its health care system) (quoting Daniel Sisto, President of the Healthcare Association of
New York State); Groves, supra note 17, at 612 (noting that "ERISA preemption affects
the funding of state health care plans" and that most state induced reforms will be challenged on the basis of ERISA's preemption clause).
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be preempted. 79 As a result, states are better able to enact laws that will

not be preempted. 8" Conversely, when courts apply the liberal, indiscriminate "connection with" method of analysis, state laws are more
likely to be preempted.8 1 Because almost any provision could be construed as bearing a relation to an ERISA plan under the expansive "connection with" analysis, this analysis effectively forces legislators to impact
79. Theoretically, legislators could check state statutes against the various factors examined to determine whether the law would trigger preemption. See infra notes 126-51
and accompanying text (describing the factors courts apply to determine whether a state
law is preempted). Compared to the task of ascertaining whether a proposed state law has
a "connection with" an ERISA plan sufficient to cause preemption, the factors provide
more concrete guidance. See Conison, supra note 22, at 669 (concluding that a preemption
analysis taking "interest and factors" into account would result in the "development of a
more principled," albeit fact-specific, body of law).
80. Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (quoting Frank McArdle, manager of
Hewitt Associates, as stating that the Travelers decision is "an open invitation to states to
become more creative" in financing health care costs); Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1129
(commenting that the Travelers decision provides for more state regulation).
A narrow interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause results in less preemption of
state law. See United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1193 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert.. denied sub nor., NYSA-ILA Welfare
Fund v. Dunston, 510 U.S. 944 (1993). The court held that a state law "relates to an ERISA plan if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it singles out such
plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated on the
existence of such a plan." Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the court held that a state
law may also be preempted if its "effect is to dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans
with regard to their benefits, structure, reporting and administration, or if allowing states
to have such rules would impair the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a
number of states." Id. at 1193 (citations omitted). When the risk of preemption is reduced, states can take a more active role in regulating health care. See Hancock, supra
note 17, at 405-07 (encouraging states to follow New York and New Jersey in their attempts
to reform health care and endorsing United Wire in which the Third Circuit refrained from
invalidating a surcharge provision on the basis of preemption). In fact, less preemption
will promote the much needed reform of our country's health care system. See id. at 407
(concluding that ERISA preemption is frustrating state health care reform efforts and that
the Supreme Court should restrict the reach of ERISA's preemption so that states can find
methods of financing health care for the indigent and uninsured). Bobinski, supra note 16,
at 348 (concluding that in the absence of an amendment to restrict the scope of preemption, a federal solution represents the most promising answer to the problem of providing
universal coverage to the indigent).
81. When courts interpret ERISA's preemption provision broadly, the result is a
greater likelihood that state laws regarding health care will be preempted. See Hancock,
supra note 17, at 405-06 (arguing that any state health care law will be preempted by ERISA and that either the Supreme Court or Congress should restrict the reach of ERISA's
preemption); Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (reporting that, in Travelers, the
Court's concerns regarding public policy resulted in a departure from the logic used in
previous decisions interpreting § 514 broadly).
According to one scholar, "states are realizing that their ability to develop a public policy with respect to health care is severely restrained by ERISA." Holloway, supra note 17,
at 422. Holloway also claims that the "exclusivity of federal employee benefit regulation"
is threatening "to interfere with state power to develop innovative health care." Id. at 405.
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health care indirectly by regulating insurance, which section 514 excludes

from the scope of the preemption clause.82
With respect to section 514(a) preemption, courts have reached conflicting conclusions regarding state laws concerning health care and hospi-

tal charges.83 For instance, in similar factual situations, a single
jurisdiction applied a narrow, multi-factor analysis to determine whether
a state law triggered section 514 in one case, and the broad, more indiscriminate "connection with" method of analysis in another. 84 Likewise, various circuit courts have applied different analyses to determine
the scope of ERISA's preemption clause.8 5 In 1985, ten years after the

82. See supra note 71 (explaining that ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) provides an exemption
from preemption for state laws regulating insurance); Holloway, supra note 17, at 422 (explaining that "states are forced to indirectly mandate health care benefits by imposing benefit-related obligations on insurance companies"); see generally McDonough, supra note 16
(discussing the preemption of mandated-provider laws and the role of the insurance exception to preemption).
83. Holloway, supra note 17, at 425-26 (discussing hospital surcharge statutes in New
Jersey, New York, and Minnesota, along with the response of federal and state courts).
84. In one case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted
the scope of § 514 narrowly. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
that a state law regarding the setting of hospital rates was not preempted by ERISA, since
an "indirect economic impact as may result from State control over hospital rates does not
run counter to ERISA's aim of national uniformity in plan regulation"), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1008 (1985). In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit applied the broad interpretation of § 514 based on its reading of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted a state law
regarding surcharges on hospital rates due to the fact that the surcharges "impose a significant economic burden on commercial insurers. [T]herefore [they] have an impermissible
impact on ERISA plan structure and administration"), rev'd sub nom., New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995);
see also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing broad and narrow methods of
analyzing whether ERISA's preemption clause has been triggered).
85. For example, when the Second Circuit decided Travelers v. Cuomo, the Court acknowledged that its decision conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in United Wire.
Travelers, 14 F.3d at 72i n.3. In United Wire, the court found that a state law did not relate
to an ERISA plan since it did not have any of three impacts which could trigger preemption. United Wire Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund, 995 F.2d 1179, 1190-91 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., NYSA-ILA Welfare Fund v. Dunston, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
For examples of courts applying the broad "connection with" method of analysis, see
Travelers, 14 F.3d 708, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1993) (relying on the "broad common-sense meaning" of the phrase "relate to" in finding that ERISA's preemption clause does not target
merely those state laws which "purport to regulate" the terms and conditions of plans or
which have only a "peripheral impact" on plans); First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr.
Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Congress used the
words 'relates to' in their broad sense and did not mean to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans" and that the language of § 514 is "'deliberately expansive"') (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987)), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Sturgis v. Herman Miller, Inc., 943 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that when a state law has a "connection with" an ERISA plan, the state law
"relate[s] to" an ERISA plan regardless of the state law's underlying intent); Powell v.
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enactment of ERISA, the Supreme Court acknowledged that section 514
is "not a model of legislative drafting." 86 The Second Circuit shared this
sentiment, as evidenced by its reference to section 514 as "a veritable
Sargasso Sea of obfuscation., 87 The Supreme Court's most recent deciChesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that
ERISA preempts a state law claim which concerns the administration of an ERISA plan
even though the claim arises from a general state law which has no impact on employee
benefits), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Servs.,
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that state's laws "which themselves have
no impact on employee benefit plans, fall within the scope of ERISA preemption" due to
the breadth of the meaning of the phrase "relate to").
For examples of courts adopting the narrower multi-factor method of determining
whether a state law falls within the scope of § 514, see Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38
F.3d 776, 781-84 (5th Cir. 1995) (declaring that "ERISA's preemptive scope ... has its
limits" and applying a two-prong test to assist in "narrowing [the] preemption inquiry" to
conclude that "ERISA's preemptive scope may be broad but it does not reach claims that
do not involve the administration of plans"); Airparts Co., Inc. v. Custom Benefit Servs. of
Austin, Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying a multi-factor analysis to determine whether ERISA preempted a state law because the scope of ERISA's preemption is
not "unlimited"); United Wire, 995 F.2d 1179, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that a state
law did not relate to an ERISA plan as it did not have any of three effects which could
trigger preemption); Van Camp v. AT & T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d 119, 123-24 (6th Cir.) (considering three factors when determining whether a state claim falls within the scope of
ERISA's preemption clause), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992); Pohl v. National Benefits
Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that it was "[niot the semantics of the word 'relate,' but the policy of the statute" that determined whether preemption was triggered); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947
F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts have relied on a "variety of factors
when determining whether a state statute . . . 'relates to' ERISA plans" and using the
multi-factor analysis to hold that an assignment statute "relates to" an ERISA plan), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.)
(ruling that "Connecticut's escheat law on ERISA benefit plans is too tenuous, remote,
and peripheral to require preemption under section 514(a)"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811
(1989); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employees Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793
F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a state law fiduciary
claim affecting the relationship between a director and a shareholder), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1034 (1987); Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 139 (holding that ERISA did not preempt a state
law regarding the setting of hospital rates, since an "indirect economic impact as may result
from State control over hospital rates does not run counter to ERISA's aim of national
uniformity in plan regulation"); Barnes Hosp. v. Sanus Passport/Preferred Servs., Inc., 809
F. Supp. 725, 727 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that the Eighth Circuit "considers a variety of
factors when determining whether a state law is preempted by ERISA").
86. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S 724, 739 (1985).
87. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom., New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671 (1995).
Sargasso weed is a "wild vine ... a mass of floating vegetation consisting chiefly of
sargasso." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2015 (1986). The Sargasso Sea is a "calm area of water located in the N[orth] Atlantic, [northeast] of the West
Indies." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1703 (2d ed.
1987). Historically, ships would become trapped in the Sargasso Sea due to the combined
effects of a lack of wind and heavy vegetation. Similarly, the language of § 514 lacks the
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sion regarding section 514, however, clarifies the preemption analysis by
moving away from the expansive "connection with" standard used in previous Supreme Court opinions, toward a more narrow multi-factor

approach.
A.

The Supreme Court's Decisions Regarding ERISA Preemption
Prior to Travelers

The confusion within the circuits as to what will trigger preemption is
ironic given the Supreme Court's numerous recent attempts to clarify the
scope of ERISA's preemption clause. 88 However, previous attempts to
construe the phrase "relate to" proved futile and ineffective as tools for
determining whether ERISA preempted a state law.89 Perhaps the most
important aspect of Travelers is the Court's recognition of the ineffectiveness of previous decisions in providing guidance regarding ERISA preemption analysis.9"
guidance necessary to navigate through the seemingly simple language of ERISA's preemptive provision.
88. Since 1981, the Supreme Court has rendered a substantial number of opinions regarding ERISA's preemption of state law. See, e.g., Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 (holding
that ERISA did not preempt a state law imposing surcharges on commercial insurers);
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992) (holding that
a District of Columbia law regarding health benefits for injured employees eligible for
workers compensation is preempted by ERISA); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65
(1990) (holding that ERISA preempted a state law regarding subrogation rights of a health
care plan); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempted a state common law claim that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee to prevent him from receiving benefits from an ERISA plan); Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1989) (concluding that ERISA did not preempt a criminal
statute prohibiting employers from withholding accrued vacation pay upon an employee's
discharge where vacation pay was to be withdrawn from the employers general assets);
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988) (holding that
ERISA preempted Georgia's antigarnishment law); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 19 (1987) (holding that ERISA did not preempt Maine's severance pay statute);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (concluding that ERISA preempted a
state common law suit for improper processing of benefits claims from an ERISA plan);
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744 (holding that ERISA did not preempt a Massachusetts
state law requiring minimum mental health-care benefits because the law regulated insurance); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 109 (1983) (concluding that ERISA
preempted a state law prohibiting discrimination in employee benefits plans on the basis of
pregnancy); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981) (holding that
ERISA preempted a New Jersey state law regarding worker's compensation because the
law interfered with the calculation of pension benefits).
89. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
90. Id. Rather than continuing to struggle with the abstract meaning of the words of
§ 514, the Court focused on the objectives of ERISA and the scope of the state law at
issue. Id.
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Prior to Travelers, the Court applied a liberal, sweeping analysis to determine whether ERISA preempted a state regulation.9 Generally, the
Court began its analysis by reiterating its opinion that the phrase "relate
to" should be accorded "its broad common sense meaning., 9 2 Such an
interpretation, the Court noted, accords with ERISA's legislative history

and gives "effect to the 'deliberately expansive' language chosen by Congress." 93 According to the Court, the common-sense meaning of the
phrase "relate to" conveyed the idea that if a state law has a "connection
with" an ERISA plan, the state law "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan.94 As a
result, ERISA preempted state laws that had a "connection with" an ER91. Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1989); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges,
869 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 1987); United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Arizona Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1986);
Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348.
92. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47; see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
93. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 192 (1992)
(quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98
(1983) (stating that § 514's "pre-emptive scope [is] ... as broad as its language").
The Court often relied on ERISA's legislative history for assistance in determining what
constitutes a "connection with" an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677-78;
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. According to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's legislative history, ERISA's preemptive provision is "deliberately expansive." See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46; See also Metropolitan Life,
471 U.S. at 744 (describing ERISA's preemptive provision as clearly expansive).
Initially, however, the scope of ERISA's preemption was more limited. Shaw, 463 U.S.
at 98 (stating that "[tihe bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable to only state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA");
Gregory, supra note 21 at 454-55 (explaining that ERISA would have preempted only state
laws that "directly conflicted with or were identical to ERISA"). The House of Representatives' version of ERISA limited preemption to matters "expressly covered by the federal
law, such as reporting, disclosure, fiduciary and funding duties, and vesting and
nonforfeitability provisions." Id. at 454 (citing H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1974); and
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4655).
The Senate opted for the broader version of preemption and provided for preemption of
"state laws relating to employee benefit plans only if the state laws directly conflicted with
or were identical to ERISA." Id. at 454-55 (citing H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699
(1973), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 5002 (1974)).
The limited scope of § 514 prompted debate in Congress. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (citing
H.R. CoN. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974); S. CorN. REP. No. 1090, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639). Following a joint conference regarding the House and Senate versions of ERISA, the preemption clause emerged
as a much broader provision than either side previously had proposed. Gregory, supra
note 21, at 455. The current § 514 resulted, including the notorious phrase "relate to,"
which would cause courts to struggle over the true scope of ERISA's preemptive provision
for years to come. Id.
94. Pilot, 481 U.S. at 47 (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 (quoting Shaw, 463
U.S. at 97)).

1330

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1309

ISA plan. 95 Under the extraordinarily malleable "connection with" analysis, almost any health care reform could have a "connection with" or
"relate to" an ERISA health benefit plan, thereby making preemption a
near certainty. 96

The Supreme Court's sweeping preemption analysis severely restricted
the ability of states to enact legislation on a variety of issues. 97 For instance, in Mackey v. Lanier CollectionAgency & Service, Inc.,98 the Court
found a state garnishing statute that merely referenced ERISA plans was
preempted, 99 even though the state enacted the statute to effectuate the
underlying purposes of ERISA. 1° ° Because of the breadth of the Court's

liberal preemption analysis, a state law consistent with the substantive
requirements of ERISA could be preempted."' Similarly, the Supreme
Court found ERISA preempted state laws where those laws affected ER95. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (concluding that a
wrongful discharge claim, brought under state common law, related to an ERISA plan and
thus was preempted).
96. Anderson, supra note 59, at 249 (stating that "the interpretation of th[e] phrase
["relate to"] has provided sufficient latitude ... to persuade courts to create the results
they want"). Hancock, supra note 17, at 405 (explaining that "any health care reform...
will have an economic impact on insurers operating in the state").
97. Courts have found that ERISA preempts a wide variety of state laws and common-law claims. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 907 (10th
Cir. 1991) (regarding life insurance); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1984) (regarding suits based on common-law breach of contract and estoppel by conduct, fraud, and deceit), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Jacobs v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 835 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (regarding a breach of contract claim);
Charlton Memorial Hosp. v. Foxboro Co., 818 F. Supp. 456,461 (D. Mass. 1993) (regarding
consumer protection); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388, 392 (E.D.
Cal. 1981)(regarding state consumer protection and unfair business practices statute);
Rhodes v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 356 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (regarding
disability insurance); see generally Holloway, supra note 17, at 406-07 (discussing the impact of ERISA on the ability of states to enact legislation); Kilberg & Heron, supra note
21, at 385-86 (discussing ERISA's impact on state laws regarding alimony and child support); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that problems inherent in ERISA
preemption implicate larger issues regarding the proper relationship between federal and
state law in general); Gabrielle Lessard, Comment, Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict of
Laws: ERISA Preemption of Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave Act, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
809, 812 (arguing that ERISA should be amended to exempt state family and medical
leave statutes from preemption).
98. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
99. Id. at 830. In Mackey, the Court examined a state law regarding garnishment
which expressly exempted ERISA benefit plans from garnishment orders. Id. at 828. "The
state statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law's
preemptive reach." Id. at 830.
100. Id. at 829. The court stated that "[liegislative 'good intentions' do not save a state
law within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 514(a)." Id. at 830. Georgia's garnishment
law protected employee benefits from being garnished. Id. at 828.
101. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1983) (citing
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983)).
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ISA plans only indirectly."' 2 While the Court acknowledged that some
state laws "may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relate[s] to' the
plan, '1 0 3 it never upheld a state law under this standard in the face of an
ERISA preemption challenge."
The Supreme Court's expansive preemption analysis 1 5 served as the
10 6
basis for many lower court decisions finding state laws preempted.
102. E.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987); see also Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted a
workers compensation law, despite the fact that the law merely indirectly related to ERISA plans).
103. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
104. Nevertheless, in two cases prior to Travelers the Supreme Court held that ERISA
did not preempt the state law at issue. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 834 (holding that ERISA
did not preempt a generally applicable garnishment law allowing for the garnishment of
ERISA welfare benefits because of the existence of § 502(d)); Fort Halifax Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987) (holding that a state law requiring lump-sum severance payments upon closing of a plant was not preempted because the state law did not
mandate the establishment of a plan).
In Mackey, the Court noted that § 502(d) allows a plan to sue and to be sued as an
entity. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833 n.7. The Court, however, also recognized that the plan
provided no mechanism for executing a judgment. Id. at 833. Because the garnishment
law in Mackey provided a method of enforcement, the Court did not find ERISA's preemption applicable. Id. at 834.
Although the Supreme Court has never used the "tenuous and remote" analysis, at least
one circuit court has found a state statute exempt from ERISA preemption under the
analysis. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.) (holding that Connecticut's escheat law on ERISA benefit plans is "too tenuous, remote, and peripheral to
require preemption under section 514(a)"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
105. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992)
(holding that ERISA preempts a District of Columbia law regarding health benefits for
injured employees eligible for workers compensation); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (holding that a state common law claim that an employee was
wrongfully discharged to prevent him from receiving benefits from an ERISA plan was
preempted); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57 (concluding that ERISA preempted a state common
law suit for improper processing of benefits claims from an ERISA plan); Shaw, 463 U.S.
at 108 (holding that ERISA preempted a state law prohibiting discrimination in employee
benefits plans on the basis of pregnancy).
106. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
ERISA preempted a state law regarding surcharges on hospital rates because the
surcharges "impose a significant economic burden on commercial insurers and ... therefore have an impermissible impact on ERISA plan structure and administration"), rev'd
sub nom., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960
F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that a state law claim that an employer mishandled benefit payments was preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Sturgis v. Herman Miller, Inc., 943 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a state law
mechanics lien claim to collect unpaid benefit contributions was preempted by ERISA);
Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1994) (concluding that state law claims against a plan administrator were preempted even though
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While most lower courts relied upon Supreme Court precedent, they had
difficulty applying the "connection with" method of analysis prescribed
by the Court.1" 7 As a result, some circuits utilized a narrower multi-factor analysis for determining when state law triggered section 514

preemption.
B.

108

The "Connection With" Method of Analysis: Providing ERISA's
Preemption Clause a Broad Scope

Various circuits have applied the literal "connection with" preemption
analysis to strike down state laws. 109 This broad interpretation was apthey involved claims of medical malpractice, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
107. Stephen R. Snodgrass, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of
"Relate To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 143, 145 (1980) (recognizing that the ERISA
preemption provision has engendered confusion and litigation).
108. Instead of trying to work with amorphous phrases such as "relate to" and "connection with," courts looked at specific factors to determine whether a state law should be
preempted under § 514. See generally Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781-84
(5th Cir. 1994) (applying a two-prong test to conclude that "ERISA's preemptive scope
may be broad but it does not reach claims that do not involve the administration of
plans"); Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minnesota Dept.
of Labor & Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Minn. 1993) (considering "whether the state
law 1) negates an ERISA plan provision, 2) affects relations between ERISA entities, 3)
alters the structure of ERISA plans, 4) affects the administration of ERISA plans, 5) has
an economic impact on ERISA plans, 6) exercises traditional state power, and 7) may be
preempted consistent with other provisions of ERISA" in determining whether a state law
"relates to" an ERISA plan), affd, 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding
that courts "have relied on a variety of factors when determining whether a state statute of
general application 'relates to' ERISA plans"), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employees Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467
(5th Cir. 1986) (using a multi-factor analysis in holding that ERISA did not preempt a state
law fiduciary claim affecting the relationship between a director and a shareholder), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
that an "indirect economic impact ... does not run counter to ERISA's aim of national
uniformity in plan regulation"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
The Third Circuit has held that "[a] rule of law relates to an ERISA plan if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it singles out such plans for special treatment, or if the rights and restrictions it creates are predicated on the existence of such a
plan." United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3rd Cir.) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
382 (1993). The court noted that if state law's "effect is to dictate or restrict the choices of
ERISA plans with regard to their benefits, structure, reporting, and administration, or if
... such rules would impair the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a number of
states." Id. at 1193.
109. See generally, Travelers, 14 F.3d at 721 (holding that a state law regarding
surcharges on hospital rates was preempted by ERISA due to the fact that the surcharges
"impose a significant economic burden on commercial insurers and ... therefore have an
impermissible impact on ERISA plan structure and administration"); Sunshine, 960 F.2d at
1550 (holding that ERISA preempted a state law cause of action based on breach of con-
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plied by four circuits. 1 0° These courts relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence in determining whether a particular state law is preempted by
ERISA, 11 ' accepting the Supreme Court's interpretation that a law "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan." ' 2
The "connection with" method of analysis afforded section 514 a broad
scope. 11 3 Applying the Supreme Court's expansive analysis helped maintain national uniformity among laws affecting the regulation of employee
benefit plans.' 14 However, the courts' sweeping interpretation of section
tract and breach of duty of care); Sturgis, 943 F.2d at 1130 (finding that ERISA preempted
a state lien statute); Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 116 (holding that ERISA preempted state
law tort claims involving medical malpractice, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
110. See Travelers, 14 F.3d at 724-25; Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1992); Sunshine, 960 F.2d at 1553-54; Sturgis, 943 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1991); Powell, 780
F.2d at 425; Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 116-17.
111. See, e.g., Smith, 959 F.2d at 9 (noting the Supreme Court's broad reading and consistent expansion of ERISA's preemption provision); Sturgis v. Herman Miller, Inc., 943
F.2d 1127,1128-29 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing the Supreme Court's Mackey and Shaw decisions
and noting that if a state law has a connection with an ERISA plan it will be preempted);
Hewlett Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (noting the
"sweeping and precise language of Section 514" was intended to be broad).
112. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); see supra notes 88-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the scope of ERISA's preemption clause and how to determine whether a state law is preempted).
113. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (recognizing the expansive scope of § 514); Sunshine First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that Congress used the phrase "relates to" in its broadest sense and that the
language of § 514 is "deliberately expansive"); see also Holloway, supra note 17, at 417
(stating that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has consistently given a broad interpretation to ERISA's preemption clause").
114. See United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir.) (noting that preemption ensures that employee benefit
plans will be subject to only one set of regulations regarding their administration), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993); Uniformity, supra note 24, at 534 (discussing the importance
of national uniformity regarding the administration of employee benefit plans and its positive impact on employers and employees); Innovation, supra note 21, at 712 (noting that
Congress intentionally used a broad preemption clause in an effort to promote national
uniformity of administrative regulations for employee benefit plans).
Uniformity is important because it reduces the administrative burdens and practical difficulties of overseeing a plan that covers participants in more than one state. Without
uniformity a plan could be subject to multiple sets of laws (possibly conflicting laws) regarding the regulation of the employer's multi-state plan, thereby increasing the administrative costs of the plan. See United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192 (explaining that "[a] patch-work
scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those
without such plans to refrain from adopting them"); supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text (discussing the advantages of uniformity for employers who cover workers from more
than one state).
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514 also acted as a roadblock to various state legislation, including health

care reform.'

15

Shortly after ERISA's enactment, the impact of the broad application
of section 514 became evident. In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,1 16 the
district court found that ERISA preempted the California Knox-Keene
Health Care Services Plan Act of 1975.117 The court rejected the argu-

ment that the language of section 514 was ambiguous and commented
that "Congress could [not] have chosen any more precise language to express its intent to preempt a state statute." 118 The California statute at
issue regulated the funding, disclosure, sales practices, and quality of
health care service plans. 119 In determining that ERISA preempted the
California state law, the court noted that conference committee reports

indicated Congress's intent to give section 514 a sweeping application.12 °
Similarly, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo,12 1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the "connection with"
analysis to conclude that ERISA preempted a statute imposing
surcharges on patients covered by commercial insurance plans. 12 2 The
court refused to apply the narrower multi-factor analysis used in its
115.

MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: THE VIEW FROM THE STATES

155 (John J.

Dilulio, Jr. & Richard R. Nathan eds., 1994). When ERISA's preemptive provision is interpreted broadly, the result is a greater likelihood that state laws regarding health care
will be preempted. See Hancock, supra note 17, at 405 (noting that ERISA has had a
disastrous effect on state attempts to improve access to health care); Experts Divided,
supra note 37, at 1348 (same). Increased risk of preemption may discourage state experimentation with health care reform. Holloway, supra note 17, at 422 (explaining that ERISA severely restrains the ability of states to address the issue of health care). During the
recent health care debate, testimony before the United States Congress demonstrated the
concern that ERISA preemption discourages state involvement in health care reform. See,
e.g., Oversight Hearingson the Administration's Health Care Proposal:HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1993) (statement of Alan Weil, Health Policy Advisor of Colorado
Governor Roy Romer); States' View of Health Care Reform: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1994) (statement of South Carolina Governor
Carroll A. Campbell, Jr.). But cf H.R. 3600: The Health Security Act. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1993) (statement of the Association of Private Pension and Welfare
Plans) (arguing in favor of a nationally uniform set of rules regulating health systems).
116. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
117. Id. at 1297.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1298-1300.
121. 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom., New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
122. Id. at 721.
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Rebaldo v. Cuomo decision nine years earlier. 123 Instead, the Second
Circuit explained that the Rebaldo rationale, which limited ERISA's preemptive scope, had been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.12 4
C. "ERISA Was Not Meant to Consume Everything in its Path";
Applying a Multi-factor Analysis to Determine Whether a
State Law Falls Within the Scope of Section 514
As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. ,125 the
Supreme Court's preemption analysis "does not, and was not intended to,
provide courts with a foolproof method for determining on which side of
the preemption line a specific state statute falls.' 1 26 Consequently, courts
began to stray from the literal "connection with" preemption analysis,
instead relying on a variety of factors to determine whether a state statute
"relate[s] to" ERISA plans. 127 Thus, while the courts continued to recognize the Supreme Court's definition of the phrase "relate[s] to," their preemption analyses began to focus upon various factors.12 8
123. Id. at 721 n.3. In Rebaldo, the Second Circuit stated that a law must "purport[ ] to
regulate" the terms or conditions of a plan in order to trigger preemption. Rebaldo v.
Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
124. Travelers, 14 F.3d at 719 (stating that "in Ingersoll-Rand [Co. v. McClendon], 498
U.S. [133], 141 [1990] .... the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that Congress
intended to limit ERISA's preemptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate plan
terms and conditions.") (emphasis in original); see also Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959
F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a "state law of general application, with only an
indirect effect on a pension plan, may nevertheless be considered to 'relate to' that plan for
preemption purposes").
125. 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992).
126. Id. at 1344.
127. Id.
128. See Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1994) (declaring that
"ERISA's preemptive scope ... has its limits" and applying a two-prong test to assist in
"narrowing [the] preemption inquiry" to conclude that "ERISA's preemptive scope may
be broad but it does not reach claims that do not involve the administration of plans ....
"); United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.,
995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3rd Cir.) (focusing on three factors to determine whether a state law
was preempted: (1) whether the state law was specifically designed to affect ERISA plans,
(2) whether the state law singles out ERISA plans for special treatment, and (3) whether
the right created by the state law was predicated on the existence of an ERISA plan), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993); Van Camp v. AT & T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d 119, 122-23 (6th Cir.)
(considering three factors when determining whether a state claim falls within the scope of
ERISA's preemption clause), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992); Arkansas Blue Cross &
Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991) using the multifactor analysis to hold that an assignment statute "relates to" an ERISA plan); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.) (holding that Connecticut's escheat law on
ERISA benefit plans is "too tenuous, remote, and peripheral to require preemption under
Section 514(a)"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee
Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
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Rather than utilizing the abstract "connection with" analysis to determine whether section 514 preempted a state law, several courts devised a
multi-factor analysis to determine whether ERISA preempted a state regulation.129 This multi-factor analysis determined whether a state law "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan by examining the ways in which the state law
at issue may affect an ERISA plan.130 Where the relationship is tangential 13 1 or indirect1 32 and "does not affect the structure, the administration,
or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan,' 3 3 the state statute
would not be preempted.13 4 The more narrow multi-factor method of
determining whether a state law fell within ERISA's preemptive provi1 35
sion was applied in several circuits.
state law fiduciary claim affecting the relationship between a director and a shareholder
was not preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Barnes Hosp. v. Sanus
Passport/Preferred Servs., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 725, 727 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that the
Eighth Circuit "considers a variety of factors when determining whether a state law is
preempted by ERISA").
129. See supra note 128 (providing cases).
130. See Arkansas Blue Cross, 947 F.2d at 1344-45 (agreeing that factors such as
whether the state law (1) invalidates a plan provision, (2) affects the structure of a plan, (3)
affects the administration of a plan, (4) has an economic impact on a plan, (5) is a traditional state power, and (6) whether preemption would be generally consistent with ERISA,
are relevant to preemption analysis).
131. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1987); see
Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that ERISA did not preempt
state regulation of hospital rates which increased the cost of doing business, because the
relationship between the state law and an ERISA plan was too tangential), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
132. Borges, 869 F.2d at 146 (stating that where a state law represents a traditional
exercise of state power and has only an indirect impact on a plan, ERISA should not
preempt the state law).
133. Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 139.
134. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir.) (holding that a "rule of law relates to an ERISA plan
if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it singles out such plans for
special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated on the existence of
such a plan" or if the state law's effect is to dictate or restrict the choices of ERISA plans
with regard to their benefits, structure, reporting, and administration, or if such rules
would impair the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a number of states) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d
142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that ERISA did not preempt a state escheat law on ERISA
benefit plans because the relationship between the state law and an ERISA plan was "too
tenuous, remote, and peripheral to require preemption under Section 514(a)"); Rebaldo,
749 F.2d at 139 (holding that an "indirect economic impact ... does not run counter to
ERISA's aim of national uniformity in plan regulation").
135. See Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 786 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying a
two-prong test to assist in narrowing ERISA's preemptive sweep); Airports Co., Inc. v.
Custom Benefit Servs., Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 1994) (examining three factors to
determine whether state claims of fraud and negligence were preempted); United Wire, 995
F.2d at 1192-93 (examining four factors to determine whether a hospital surcharge provision was preempted by ERISA); Van Camp v. AT & T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d 119, 122-23 (6th
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The circuits using the multi-factor analysis modified the Supreme
Court's "connection with" method of analysis and adopted a more restrictive approach in determining whether section 514 preemption has
been triggered.1 36 According to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, the additional factors provided guidance by reflecting
the concerns that prompted Congress to enact the preemption clause of
ERISA. 137 Although the factors varied from circuit to circuit, 138 most
courts asked whether the state law covered an area of traditional state
authority, whether the effect on ERISA plans was incidental, and
whether the state law impacted the structure and administration of ERCir.) (relying on three factors to determine whether ERISA will preempt a state law), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc.,
947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that other courts have utilized the multifactor analysis and applying the multi-factor analysis to hold that an assignment statute
"relate[s] to" an ERISA plan), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Borges, 869 F.2d at 146
(holding that state laws concerning a traditional exercise of state power should not be
preempted where the effect on an ERISA plan is only indirect); Sommers Drug Stores Co.
Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir.) (focusing
on the impact of a state law as it "affects relations among principal ERISA entities"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1987) (looking at whether the state law represents a traditional exercise of state authority, affects relations among principal ERISA entities, or has an incidental affect on ERISA plans to determine whether the sate law is
preempted); United Food & Commercial Workers Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1986) (explaining that a state law must "purport to regulate" an ERISA plan to trigger
preemption); Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders v. Minnesota Dept. of Labor &
Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Minn. 1993) (relying on seven factors to assist in determining whether a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan), aff'd, 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995);
Barnes Hosp. v. Sanus PassportlPreferred Servs., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 725, 727 (E.D. Mo.
1992) (relying on a "variety of factors when determining whether a state law is preempted
by ERISA").
136. See Holloway, supra note 17, at 418 n.66 (noting that some federal courts have
applied a multi-factor test to determine whether a state law is preempted by ERISA).
137. Van Camp, 963 F.2d at 123.
138. For instance, in Arkansas Blue Cross, the Eighth Circuit explicitly recognized
seven factors to be examined when determining whether the state law is preempted. Arkansas Blue Cross, 947 F.2d at 1344-45. The factors included:
[W]hether the state law negates an ERISA plan provision .... whether the state
law affects relations between primary ERISA entities, . . whether the state law
impacts the administration of ERISA plans ... whether the state law has an
economic impact on ERISA plans . ..whether the preemption of state law is
consistent with other ERISA provisions ....and whether the state law is an exercise of traditional state power.
Id. (citations omitted).
Alternatively, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, the Sixth Circuit examined
only three factors. Firestone, 810 F.2d at 555-556. The factors included: (1) "whether the
state law represents a traditional exercise of state authority," (2) whether the state law
"affects [the] relations among the principal ERISA entities," and (3) "the incidental nature
of any possible effect of the state law on an ERISA plan." Id.
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ISA plans. 139 As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

however, the factors applied in a multi-factor analysis are not exhaustive
140

and no single factor is dispositive.
The use of the multi-factor analysis led to a more restrictive interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause.1 41 In United Wire, Metal & Machine
Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital,14 2 the Third
Circuit held that a New Jersey law setting hospital rates did not "relate
to" ERISA plans in a way that triggered preemption. 143 The United Wire
court examined the intent of the state law, whether the state law targeted
ERISA plans for special treatment, whether the state law influenced the

structure of ERISA plans, whether the state law affected an ERISA
plan's ability to operate across state lines, and whether the state law effectively regulated the way an ERISA plan is operated. 4 4
Previously, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Rebaldo
V. Cuomo, 1 45 holding that a state law regulating hospital rates had an
"indirect economic impact" on ERISA plans and did not trigger preemption.1 46 In Rebaldo, the Second Circuit stated that "a state law must 'purport[ ] to regulate.., the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans'
to fall within the preemptive provision.' ' 1 47 Although the Second Circuit
subsequently overturned the Rebaldo decision when it adopted a broad

139. Van Camp, 963 F.2d at 123; Arkansas Blue Cross, 947 F.2d at 1344-45; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1989); Sommers, 793 F.2d at 1466; Firestone, 810 F.2d at 555; Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1160-61; Barnes, 809 F. Supp. at 727.
140. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1989); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1345 (8th Cir. 1991).
141. See United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3rd Cir.) (applying a multi-factor analysis to protect a state law from
preemption, while noting that a similar law was held preempted by the Second circuit
where the traditional preemption analysis was used), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993); see
also Hancock, supra note 17, at 396-97 (discussing the Third Circuit's refusal to extend
preemption while applying a multi-factor approach).
142. 995 F.2d 1179 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
143. Id. at 1196 (stating that "we are unwilling to attribute to Congress and § 514 an
intent to frustrate the efforts of a state, under its police power, to regulate health care
costs.").
144. Id. at 1195.
145. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
146. Id. at 139 (holding that a state law regarding the setting of hospital rates was not
preempted by ERISA, because an "indirect economic impact as may result from State
control over hospital rates does not run counter to ERISA's aim of national uniformity in
plan regulation").
147. Id. at 137 (quoting in part 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1994)).
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in its Travelers decision,' 48 the Third
approach to ERISA preemption
149
Circuit adopted Rebaldo.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Travelers, the courts of
appeals were divided as to the appropriate method of ascertaining the
scope of ERISA's preemptive provision.1 50 Travelers provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the proper method of determining whether ERISA preempted a state law. In Travelers, the
that "ERISA was not meant to consume
Supreme Court recognized
' 15 1
"
path.
its
in
everything
II.

RECOGNIZING PAST FAILURES: THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES
SEcrION 514(A) ANALYSIS

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court
adopted a narrower method of determining when a state law triggers section 514 preemption. 1 52 By no longer focusing on the literal "connection
with" analysis of section 514, the Court effectively restricted the scope of
148. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nora., New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct.
1671 (1995).
149. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1193-95 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
150. The Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adhered to the Supreme
Court's language and the "connection with" method of analysis in determining whether
§ 514 preemption has been triggered. See, e.g., Travelers, 14 F.3d at 718; First Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Sturgis v. Herman Miller, Inc., 943 F. 2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); see also supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (explaining
the Supreme Court's "connection with" method of analysis) or 106-24 (explaining the application of "connection with" analysis by various circuit courts).
The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth circuits adopted a more restrictive approach than the Supreme Court, applying a multi-factor test to determine
whether ERISA preempts state law. See, e.g., Airports Co., Inc. v. Custom Benefit Servs.,
Inc., 28 F.3d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying a multi-factor analysis to determine
whether a state law was preempted); United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1195 (examining state laws
for four factors that trigger ERISA preemption); Van Camp v. AT & T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d
119, 122-23 (6th Cir.) (considering three factors when determining whether a state claim
falls within the scope of ERISA's preemption clause), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992);
Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing
that it is "[n]ot the semantics of the word 'relate,' but the policy of the statute" that determines whether preemption will be triggered); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying a lengthy, multi-factor
analysis), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit
Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467-68 (5th Cir.) (applying a multi-factor
analysis), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987).
151. Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 786 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995). See also Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (report-

1340

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1309

ERISA's preemption. 5 3 In Travelers, the Court concluded that ERISA
did not preempt a New York state law. 1 54 The Court held that the stat-

ute's indirect effect upon the choices made by plan administrators when
purchasing insurance did not invoke section 514's preemption clause. 55
Initially, Travelers appeared to follow the Court's usual ERISA preemption analysis. 156 The Court recognized that generally a presumption

exists against preemption,' 57 but noted that ERISA contains an express
provision mandating federal preemption of state law. 158 The Court acknowledged that while Congress explicitly provided for preemption, 159

Congress left the scope of preemption unclear. 160 Unfortunately, a mere
reading of the statute provided no guidance. 16 1 For guidance, the Court
turned to the legislative history to ascertain Congress's intent in enacting
section 514.162
After noting the legislative intent behind ERISA's preemption
clause, 6 3 the Supreme Court tried to resolve the ambiguity of section 514
ing that "'the court is drawing a line and backing away from some of the logic of its previous decisions"') (quoting Frank McArdle, manager of Hewitt Associates).
153. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1683 (rejecting its prior decisions favoring the "connection with" analysis).
154. Id. (stating that because the surcharge provisions have only an indirect impact on
the price of insurance, Congress could not have intended to preempt the state surcharge
law).
155. Id. at 1680.
156. Id. at 1676-77 (discussing the doctrine of preemption and Congressional intent).
157. Id. at 1676 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
158. Id. at 1677.
159. Id. (noting that the "governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive").
160. Id. As the Court observed, "one might be excused for wondering, at first blush,
whether the words of limitation ('insofar as they ... relate') do much limiting .... [W]e
have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us
much help drawing the line here." Id.
161. Id. The court noted that, "[i]f 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest
stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its
course for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere ... ' Id. (quoting H. JAMES,
RODERIcK HUDSON xli (New York ed. 1980)).
162. Id. at 1676-78 (examining ERISA's legislative history and finding that it was Congress's intent to make the regulation of employee benefits an exclusively federal concern to
"avoid multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration
of employee benefit plans"). But see, Conison, supra note 22, at 646 (stating that the legislative history of ERISA provides no guidance in ascertaining the meaning of the phrase
"relates to").
163. The court noted that Congress's intent in providing § 514 with broad language was
to establish the regulation of employee benefit plans "'as exclusively a federal concern."'
Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
523 (1981)). The Court explained that the basic purpose of the preemption clause was to
promote a nationally uniform set of regulations regarding employee benefit plans. Id. at
1677-78.
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by focusing on the phrase "relate to."'" Quoting its widely recognized
explanation from Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Court stated that, "'[a]
law 'relate[s] to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."",165 When
an analysis of the scope of ERISA's preemption begins with this definition, a court must first determine whether the state law at issue either has
a "connection with" or makes "reference to" an ERISA plan. 166 In Travelers, the Court recognized the difficulty and impracticability of applying
167
the literal "connection with" method of analysis.
The state law at issue in Travelers did not refer to an ERISA plan.
Thus, the Court analyzed whether the law had a "connection with" an
ERISA plan, 168 and attempted to answer the question of what constitutes
a "connection with.' 69 The Court unanimously decided to break with its
traditional "connection with" analysis because "[fior the same reason that
infinite relations cannot be the measure of preemption, neither can infinite connections."' 7 ° This pronouncement freed the Court from the difficulties of employing a literal/semantical interpretation, rather than a
functional interpretation, of the phrase "relate to.' 1 7 1 The Court emphasized that the focus of determining the scope of section 514 lies not in the
literal interpretation of words such as "connection with" or "relate to,"
but in the examination of the practical effects of the state law upon an
ERISA plan. 72 By rejecting a preemption analysis based on semantical
164. Id. at 1677 (discussing the difficulty ascertaining the true meaning of the phrase
"relate to"). Id. at 1676-78. Despite the fact that defining the scope of § 514 has been
problematic, at least one court has held that the section is not unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297-98 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
affd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).

165. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 9697 (1983)).

166. Id. The Court recognized that the question of whether a state law has a "connection with" an ERISA plan was no more helpful than determining whether the law "relates
to" an ERISA plan. Id.
167. Id. The result was a departure from its literal "connection with" method of analysis and acceptance of a multi-factor analysis; see supra notes 125-151 and accompanying
text (regarding the circuit courts adoption of the multi-factor analysis).

168. Id.
169. Id. The Court noted that the phrase "connection with" was "an uncritical literalism" and was as helpful as the phrase "relates to" when trying to determine whether a state

law is preempted. Id.
170. Id.
171. The Court noted that "[wie simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the

ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive." Id.
172. See id. at 1678-79 (taking note of the "purpose and the effects" of the state
surcharge statute).
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interpretations of phrases, the Court effectively adopted the multi-factor
17 3
analysis that had been applied in the various circuits.
The Court's multi-factor analysis was less explicit than that of the
Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits. First, the Court examined the purpose
and effects of the New York surcharge statute. 174 The Court found that
the state law did not affect the administration of ERISA plans.17 5 Specifically, the Court tried to determine whether the New York state law
would encroach upon ERISA's promotion of national uniformity within
employee benefit plan administration. 176 Second, the Court considered
whether the law concerned a matter that the states traditionally regulated.177 The Court noted that health care regulation historically has
been a matter of local concern. 178 The Court concluded that Congress
179
did not intend to preempt state health care regulations.
After considering these factors in light of the policies behind section
514, the Court found that the New York statute did not have the effect of
regulating ERISA plans and therefore was not subject to preemption. 180
While the Court recognized that the statute would indirectly impact ERISA plans, it held that the state law did not "relate to" an ERISA plan
within the meaning of section 514.181
Determining whether a state law "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan is no
longer an exercise in semantics. Rather, courts may look for specific factors indicating that section 514 should be triggered. For instance, where a
state law effectively regulates benefit structures, plan administration, or
enforcement mechanisms, the Court will find that the state law suffi1 82
ciently "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan to trigger preemption.
173. See supra notes 125-151 and accompanying text (regarding the multi-factor analysis and its application within the circuit courts).
174. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1680.
178. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707
(1985)).
179. Id. "In sum, cost-uniformity was almost certainly not an object of pre-emption...
[and is] a far cry from those 'conflicting directives' from which Congress meant to insulate
ERISA plans." Id.
180. See id. Specifically, the Court held that cost uniformity was not an intended object
of preemption and that such state laws do not have a sufficient "connection with" ERISA
plans to trigger preemption. Id.
181. See id. (finding that an insufficient nexus existed to trigger ERISA preemption).
182. See id. at 1678. The Court was careful to distinguish the surcharge provision from
other state laws that previously were determined to have a sufficient "connection with" an
ERISA plan to trigger preemption. Id. It pointed out that the state laws preempted by
§ 514 involved impacts on plan structure, administration and enforcement mechanisms. Id.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Travelers marks a turning point in the
evolution of ERISA preemption. Prior to Travelers, the scope of ERISA's preemption clause was considered broad.' 8 3 It generally was accepted that when states enacted legislation concerning health care, they
ran a high risk of being preempted. 184 The Travelers decision changes
this trend. 185

183. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983) (stating that "§ 514's preemptive scope [is] as broad as its language"); see also American Progressive Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1983) (commenting that § 514 has a sweeping effect and that exceptions to preemption are meant to be narrow); Francis v. United
Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (noting that Congress intended
§ 514 to effect the broadest possible preemption of state law).
184. When courts interpret broadly ERISA's preemptive provision, the result is a
greater likelihood that state laws regarding health care will be preempted. See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 17, at 406 (arguing that Congress should reexamine ERISA's preemption
clause in light of its impact on health care laws and noting that, in the absence of federal
health care reform, states have attempted to enact their own reforms, only to have their
laws fall prey to ERISA); Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (noting that in decisions
prior to Travelers, the Court broadly interpreted § 514). Increased risk of preemption may
discourage state experimentation with health care reform. Id.; see also Holloway, supra
note 17, at 422 (recognizing that a broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause
restricts the ability of states to respond to the plight of the uninsured).
For example, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempts a state law prohibiting discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of
pregnancy, since the state law relates to an ERISA plan. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. In Shaw
the Court interpreted the phrase "relate to" by turning to Black's Law Dictionary and
concluded that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan ... if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan." Id. at 96-97 & n.16.
185. Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (quoting Joy Johnson Wilson, director of
the health committee, National Conference of State Legislatures, regarding the Supreme
Court's new standard pronounced in Travelers, that a new state law must have "an acute
economic impact" to be impermissible).
Reactions to the decision have been mixed. "'This is great news for hospitals and their
patients,' said Daniel Sisto, president of the Healthcare Association of New York State."
Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1129. "'This means that states ... can continue to reform
their health care delivery systems to meet the needs of all persons."' Id. Proponents of
ERISA preemption, however, fear that the decision will result in "intrusive state regulation." Id. The Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans was "deeply concerned"
that the Travelers opinion would lead to the enactment of state laws that will impose "cost
burdens on plan sponsors." Id.
ERISA's preemptive provision has been viewed as an obstacle to enacting health care
legislation. Where states serve as "a laboratory of [health care] reform" ERISA may be
considered a "roadblock" to health care reform initiatives. Innovation, supra note 21, at
712; see also Hancock, supra note 17, at 403-404 (discussing the disastrous effect of ERISA
preemption on state health care reform efforts).
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THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE MULTIFACTOR ANALYSIS

In Travelers, the Court departed from its traditional, literal "connection with" analysis and applied a new, practical multi-factor analysis.' 86
In doing so, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the section 514
preemption clause. 187 The adoption of the multi-factor analysis makes it
easier for courts to determine when section 514 preemption is triggered. 18 8 Furthermore, the predictability of the multi-factor analysis
helps promote state involvement in health care reform. 8 9 By indirectly
promoting state involvement in resolving the health care crisis, the Court
supports the current policy of diminishing federal involvement in national
issues and encourages states to find their own creative solutions.' 90

186. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1680. "What is most interesting about this ruling is the new,
higher standard regarding the level of economic impact a state law must have to be preempted by ERISA." Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1130 (quoting Mark Lutes).
187. See Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (citing one expert who interpreted the
decision as withdrawing from previous decisions giving ERISA §5 (A) broad, preemptive
power).
188. Rather than being forced to deal with abstract ideas such as "connections" and
"relationships," courts may evaluate a state law on the basis of specific factors and how
those factors intrude upon the purposes of ERISA preemption. See supra notes 125-151
an accompanying text (discussing the multi-factor analysis).
189. Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1130. One attorney has stated that the Court's new
rationale will make it more difficult to argue for preemption in some cases. Id. "'The
decision ... maintains New York state's flexibility in redesigning our reimbursement system to achieve our objectives of expanding access to high quality medical services at an
affordable cost."' Id. (quoting Barbara A. DeBuono, New York State Health
Commissioner).
190. See Nina Bernstein, An Accountability Issue: As States Gain PoliticalPower, a Ruling Seems to Free Them of Some Legal Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al (reporting
on the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Seminole Tribe v. Florida and commenting
that the decision is another example of the current trend which shifts political power from
the federal government to state governments); Joan Biskupic, Justices Shift Federal-State
Power Balance: Rehnquist-Led Majority Determined to Restrict Washington's Authority,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al (reporting that the Court has "been working to curtail
the powers of Congress and enhance that of the states" and noting that this shift of power
mirrors Congress's trend of shifting responsibility for social programs from the federal government to the states). See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 (1996)
(holding that the Commerce Clause did not enable Congress to intrude upon the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity); U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 1634 (1995) (refusing to extend the Commerce Clause to allow the federal government to regulate the carrying of handguns within a specified proximity of schools and holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
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A New Analysis for Determining Whether a State Law Falls Within
the Scope of ERISA's Preemption Clause

Applying the Supreme Court's literal "connection with" analysis forced
courts to deal with abstract ideas such as the sufficiency of a relationship
between a state law and ERISA, without providing a concrete analytical
framework. 19 ' Courts and practitioners often struggled with what constituted a sufficient "connection with" an ERISA plan to trigger preemption." 9 Given the confusion within the courts below, the "connection
with" method of analysis obviously failed to provide sufficient guidance
in determining whether ERISA preempted a state law.' 93 Perhaps this
failure prompted the Supreme Court to break with long-standing precedent in favor of a less expansive interpretation of the preemption clause.
In Travelers, the Court asked whether the state law has the practical
effect of regulating ERISA plans and whether the law would preclude
uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate
benefit package. 194 The Supreme Court seems to have accepted the circuit courts' practice of examining various factors to determine whether a
state law falls within the scope of section 514.191 In short, the Court
looked to the legislative history of ERISA and took a functional approach to determine whether Congress would have intended to preempt
196
the state law at issue.
The functional, multi-factor approach applies tangible factors that produce a more ascertainable result than the literal, yet abstract, "connection
with" approach. 97 In Travelers, the Court looked to the purpose and
effects of the surcharge statute. 98 Specifically, the Court noted that setting hospital rate differentials represented a common health care regula191. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
192. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (discussing the impracticabilities of
the "connection with" standard); see also Snodgrass, supra note 107, at 145 (recognizing
that § 514 has caused confusion); Hancock, supra note 17, at 395-96 (noting that courts
have had difficulty defining the scope of ERISA's preemption clause and characterizing
the preemption issue as "thorny").
193. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion within the
lower courts prior to the Travelers decision).
194. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
195. Id. at 1677.
196. Id. at 1677-78.
197. See Conison, supra note 22, at 669 (concluding that preemption analysis should be
conducted on a case by case basis taking "interests and factors" into account and arguing
that such an analysis would permit the "development of a more principled, even if particularistic, body of law").
198. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
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tion and a matter of local concern.' 9 9 It also discussed the indirect

economic influence that the state law may have on ERISA plans.2 °° Indeed, the Court noted that the "indirect influence of the surcharges [do

not] preclude uniform administrative
practice or the provision of a uni20 1
form interstate benefit package.
When confronted with the issue of ERISA preemption, courts and
practitioners are no longer forced to grapple with the philosophical question of what constitutes "connection with" an ERISA plan.20 2 Instead,
they can look to a variety of factors, such as whether the state law negates
an ERISA plan provision, alters the structure of an ERISA plan, impacts
the administration of a plan, or exercises a traditional state power 20 3 to
determine whether section 514 has been triggered.20 4 Accordingly, this
approach enables practitioners and legislators alike to predict whether
ERISA will preempt the state law at issue.

199. Id. at 1680. In other words, statutes setting hospital rate differentials are an exercise of traditional state power. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985)).
200. Id. at 1679.
201. Id.
202. See Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992)
(stating that "[niot the semantics of the word 'relate,' but the policy of the statute, requires
preemption"). Rather than struggling with ascertaining the practical meanings of phrases
such as "relates to" and "connection with" courts may now look to specific factors; see
supra note 108 (identifying decisions where courts have applied the multi-factor analysis
and examples of the types of factors used).
203. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1680 (applying a mutli-factor analysis including the factor of
whether the state law exercises a traditional state power); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
957 (1992) (examining a state law to determine whether any of seven factors trigger preemption); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1987) (utilizing a multi-factor analysis that included the factor of whether the state law exercised a
traditional state power); Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders v. Minnesota Dept. of
Labor & Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Minn. 1993) (applying a multi-factor test and
examining whether the state law negates an ERISA provision, alters the structure of an
ERISA plan, affects the administration of a plan, or involves a traditional state power),
affd, 47 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 1995).
204. See United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3rd Cir.) (noting that a law "relates to an ERISA plan if it is
specifically designed to affect employee plans, if it singles out such plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated on the existence of such a
plan"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993); Arkansas Blue Cross, 947 F.2d at 1344-45 (providing a comprehensive list of factors employed by the circuits to determine whether a state
statute "relates to" ERISA).
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The Court's New Section 514 Analysis Promotes State Involvement
in the Resolution of the Health Care Crisis

In Travelers, the Court substantially narrowed the reach of ERISA's
preemption clause.2 °5 By refocusing preemption analysis away from the
literal "connection with" standard, the expansive scope of ERISA's preemption clause has been curtailed2 °6 and made more predictable.2 °7 Additionally, the multi-factor analysis honors the traditional state role in
protecting the health of its citizens through the exercise of police
powers.20 8
The Court's new method of analysis carefully examines the practical
effects that a state law may have upon an ERISA plan to determine
whether federal law preempts the state law.20 9 Under this approach, the
purpose and effect of a state law determines whether the law will be preempted by ERISA.2 1 ° Thus, state laws can be scrutinized to determine
whether they will interfere with the uniform administration of ERISA
plans or the ability to provide uniform interstate benefit packages.2 1 '
205. Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (explaining that the court is receding from
its expansive interpretation of ERISA preemption because of public policy concerns).
206. See id. (discussing the new freedom given to states to finance health care reform
due to the Court's more restrictive reading of ERISA's scope of preemption); Groves,
supra note 17, at 651 (recognizing that the Travelers decision adopted a less stringent approach to ERISA preemption). But see, Decision, supra note 21, at 1837 (asserting that
the Travelers decision can be viewed as preserving the scope of ERISA's preemption
clause rather than limiting it).
207. In circuit court cases considering similar state laws, courts have narrowed the
scope of ERISA preemption. See United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196 (holding that ERISA did
not preempt state laws regarding the setting of hospital rates); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d
133, 140 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a New York law regulating
hospital rates), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); see also United Food & Commercial
Workers & Employers Arizona Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th
Cir. 1986) (applying the multi-factor analysis to find that ERISA did not preempt state
subrogation laws).
208. See Hancock, supra note 17, at 398 n.118 (citing Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp.
1307 (D. Minn. 1994))(asserting that Congress never intended to frustrate state efforts to
regulate health care).
209. Practitioners must look to a variety of factors to determine whether a state law
should fall within the scope of § 514(a) preemption. See supra notes 127-150 and accompanying text. These factors include, but are not limited to, the legislative intent behind ERISA's preemption clause, the purpose of the state law, whether the state law would have a
"tenuous, remote or peripheral" impact on plans covered by ERISA, and whether the state
law could lead to "conflicting directives." New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-80 (1995). For a list of cases
applying multi-factor analyses, see supra note 135.
210. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1678.
211. See id. at 1679 (considering whether the state statute at issue precluded "uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package"); United
Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192 (noting that the purpose of pre-emption is to ensure uniformity in
the administrative practices of ERISA plans).
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Providing a concrete analytical framework makes ERISA preemption
more predictable.
It is likely that the Supreme Court's more restrictive and predictable
approach to determining whether a state law triggers preemption will result in increased state experimentation with health care reform.2 12 States

can now apply a multi-factor preemption analysis to test their legislation
for any effects that may trigger preemption prior to enacting legislation.
Armed with the ability to foresee whether a law will be preempted, state
legislatures may take a more active role in health care reform.2 13 The

Court's new interpretation of ERISA preemption appears to be in accord
with the current trend of states seeking to assert more control and receiving less interference from the federal government.2 1 4
C. The Travelers Decision Supports the Trend of Providing States the
Opportunity to Find Creative Solutions to National Problems
The Travelers decision is very timely given the current trend toward
providing states more latitude to deal with issues of national concern. 15
The Travelers decision can be seen as a manifestation of federalism, shifting power from the federal government to the states.2 16 Federalism is
central to the structure of the government of the United States.2 17
212. Surcharges, supra note 24, at 1129; see Hancock, supra note 17, at 407 (concluding
that the Supreme Court should adopt the "enlightened" approach taken by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in United Wire and restrict the scope of § 514 so that states
may enact legislation to finance health care for indigent and uninsured patients).
213. Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348 (quoting Joy Johnson Wilson, director of
the health committee, National Conference of State Legislatures, "[c]ertainly we know we
can [impose taxes on health providers] now without fearing litigation on ERISA"); see also
Hancock, supra note 17, at 398 (noting that the more restrictive approach adopted in
United Wire allows states to actively pursue health care reform).
214. See Hancock, supra note 17, at 398. States have been long involved in attempting
to reform health care. Michael S. Dukakis, The States And Health Care Reform, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1090 (1992); TIMOTHY CURLEY, ET AL., STATE PROGRESS IN HEALTH CARE
REFORM, 1992 (National Governors' Association 1993).
215. Hancock, supra note 17, at 403 (noting that the burden of reforming health care
has shifted to the states since the federal government abandoned its reform efforts);
Groves, supra note 17, at 609 (explaining that Congress's failure to reform health care has
focused attention on state efforts at reform); id. at 610 n.6 (noting that forty states were
actively involved in health care reform as of 1993).
216. JAY M. SHAFRITZ, THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 226 (Harper 1992) (describing federalism as "[a] system of governance in which a national, overarching government shares power with . . . state
governments").
217. THE FEDERAL, passim Rule 15.7(b) (commenting on the United States Constitution and the theories behind it).
The following books provide insightful discussion regarding federalism and its role in
American society: WALTER H. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964)
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Whether or not the health care crisis should be resolved by employing

a federalist approach is currently under debate.218 The federalist approach to health care suggests that states should be encouraged to find
creative solutions to the national health care problem.2 1 9 However, in
order for states to take a more active220role, they must overcome the obstacle of ERISA's preemption clause.
Throughout the health care debate and during the innumerable Congressional hearings on health care reform, the issue of ERISA preemption was a common concern. Those in favor of a national resolution to
the health care crisis favored a strong preemption clause and a nationally
uniform set of regulations.22 1 Conversely, those in favor of allowing
states to take an active role in resolving the health care dilemma proposed amending ERISA to curtail the preemptive effect of section 514.222
(arguing that despite the twentieth century trend toward national solutions to national
problems, states still hold substantial power to advance their local interests); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987) (providing a historical perspective regarding federalism in the United States); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION ch. XVI (Boston Little, Brown Co. 1890) (providing a

comprehensive overview of the police power of the states); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Federalism in the Future, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE (Janice C. Griffith ed.,
1989) (providing an analysis of the future of federalism in the United States); ROSCOE C.
MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1965) (arguing that cities have become
key players in the United States federal system); WALTER THOMPSON, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY AND CRITICISM OF THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION (1923) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the expanding role of the federal
government and noting its efforts to promote public health via the Commerce Clause).
218. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 23 at 116-19 (suggesting a federalist, statebased solution to the health care crisis); Schmidt, supra note 23, at 147 (criticizing Mashaw
& Marmor's proposed federalist solution to health care and arguing that a federalist approach would result in a "crazy quilt of varying state regulation").
219. See generally Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 23, at 117 (arguing that it is unlikely
that one system will suffice for the entire nation).
220. See id. at 117-18, 125-26 (arguing that ERISA should be amended to allow states
more discretion, but noting that an amendment is unlikely due to the influence of powerful
interest groups such as corporations and unions). For an in-depth discussion of the negative effects of ERISA on the federalist approach to health care, see Hancock, supra note
17, at 383 (arguing that ERISA has had a disastrous effect on state health care reform);
Holloway, supra note 17, at 454 (concluding that ERISA has a negative impact on state
health care reforms and arguing that subjecting the states to almost total dependence on
federal regulation signals a decline in federalism); cf Gregory, supra note 21, at 490 (arguing that ERISA may be tailored to accommodate the "evolving dynamics of federalism").
221. See H.R. 3600: The Health Security Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on LaborManagement Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 335
(1993) (statement of the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans) (arguing in
favor of ERISA preemption and the promotion of a nationally uniform set of rules regulating health systems).
222. See CURLEY ET AL., supra note 214.
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Pro-state advocates also encouraged the use of "exemptions" or "waivers" from ERISA preemption. 23

Therefore, as the Supreme Court limits the expansive sweep of ERISA's preemption clause, it limits the role of the federal government in
health care reform and promotes state experimentation. According to
the Pension and Benefits Reporter, the Travelers decision amounts to "an

open invitation for states to become creative in using different kinds of
assessments to pay for health care., 22 4 Perhaps this opportunity for experimentation with creative health care alternatives will be the most impressive result of the Travelers decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Travelers, the Supreme Court signaled an end to its previously everexpanding application of ERISA's preemption clause. Practitioners, students, and courts no longer will be confronted with the philosophical
questions of what constitutes a literal "connection with" an ERISA plan
or whether state law sufficiently "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan. Instead,
more ascertainable factors such as economic impact, conflicts between
the state law and ERISA, and effects upon administration of ERISA
plans will be the focus of preemption analysis. By focusing on specific
factors, the Court has created two consequences. First, the Court substantially narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption. Second, the Court
effectively invited states to play a more active role in resolving the health
care crisis.
Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell

223. Id. (reviewing state efforts in health care reform). Hawaii has been able to actively pursue health care reform at the state level due to its exemption from ERISA preemption. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 23, at 124 (discussing Hawaii's success in
providing almost universal health care coverage); see also ERISA § 514(b)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(5) (1994).
224. Experts Divided, supra note 37, at 1348; see Groves, supra note 17, at 620 n.65
(noting that with the Travelers decision, the Supreme Court "signaled that its ever-expanding view of the ERISA preemption clauses [sic] may be at an end"). According to
Groves, there are two ways in which states may enact laws to reform health care without
being preempted. One is to enact legislation that escapes the "relate[s] to" clause. Id. at
624. He notes, however, that to utilize this approach would require that courts more narrowly interpret the scope of § 514. Id. Based on a reading of the Travelers case, Groves
concludes that state laws utilizing cost-shifting schemes to subsidize medicare or Blue
Cross/Blue Shield will not be preempted. Id. Also, laws of general applicability will be
preempted if they significantly burden employee benefit plans. Id. at 624-25.

